Investment Thesis | TVIDIA

Rating: | 4 Year IRR:

BUY! 23.2%



Long NVIDIA: The time to own the Future is now

1. Proprietary, integrated ecosystem underpins Nvidia's edge

+85% Market Share
In GPUs

Hardware + Software + CUDA = Competitive Advantage

2. Jensen's long-view, powered by Nvidia's human capital

Jensen owns ~3% of NVIDIA

16 Years

Average executive tenure

3. Why buy NVIDIA: ecosystem + talent primed to beat expectations

Ecosystem + Talent =
Structural advantages in Al

Just the beginning of a

Promising market

Thesis numbers summary:

23.2% 2028 IRR

Entry Value ₂₀₂₅ US\$3.4 *Trillions*

29X P/E Entry Multiple₁

28x P/E Exit Multiple

Exit Value ₂₀₂₈
US\$5.7 *Trillions*


NVIDIA at a Glance

Founded in 1993 with a focus on gaming, NVIDIA is now the world's most valuable company, driven primarily by its leadership in data centers


I. Once gaming-focused, NVIDIA's product line now underpins AI infrastructure



II. AI overtook gaming and data centers became NVIDIA's core business




III. Nvidia tripled its margins since 2022, driven by AI and strong operating leverage



IV. Top buyers like Microsoft made NVIDIA the core enabler of the AI era

Estimated shipments of Nvidia Hopper GPUs in 2024, by customer (in thousands)






GPUs: NVIDIA's Main Product


Pioneered by NVIDIA, the GPU unlocked unprecedented leaps in data processing power across multiple applications


I. Built to ease CPU strain, GPUs specialized in rendering tasks through parallel processing




III. Programmability and high data throughput make GPUs ideal for heavy workloads

Flexibility through end markets






II. By breaking Moore's Law, GPUs disrupted the ceiling of computational power



IV. GPUs powered extraordinary ML breakthroughs with parallelism and scalability

Training Compute of Notable Machine Learning Systems Over Time (FLOP)




MOAT I: Ahead in GPU Technology

Early vision and execution secured GPU leadership, a position it's poised to strengthen in the future

I. Execution ensured NVIDIA's survival in a market where competitors disappeared

What about the competitors in this market?




Jon Y., Asianometry Founder




What has driven NVIDIA's GPU edge over AMD over time?


"The main reason is due to their **GPU-centric vision** and the **exceptional execution** capability of their R&D team"



II. Delivers superior cost-benefit in its GPUs when compared to rivals



IV. Shortening product launch cycles, entrants face a suffocating competitive landscape







MOAT II: NVLink Scale Capabilities


With NVLink, NVIDIA introduced a new scale-up paradigm through ultra-fast GPU interconnections

I. To boost performance, simply increasing the number of GPUs eventually hits a limit

II. NVLink broke the scaling barrier—enabling limitless performance through added GPUs








Evolution

III. Accelerated GPU communication made it possible to unify 72 GPUs into a single compute entity—the next leap is linking full racks and turning them into an ultra GPU




MOAT III: Software Switching Costs

NVIDIA's core moat, CUDA, provides industry-leading GPU performance and reinforces customer dependency


I. Launched in 2006, CUDA enabled GPU programmability and performance enhancement

What made the GPU so programmable?




II. CUDA enhances GPU efficiency by enabling fine-grained programmability






III. AMD's solution late 2016 launch gave CUDA a head start through the network effect

CUDA (NVIDIA) vs. ROCm (AMD): Measuring Content Presence on YouTube



IV. More developers, stronger lock-in—CUDA reinforces retention

CUDA Developers (Million)





Competitive Advantage

With a unique blend of competitive strengths and world-class execution, NVIDIA is strongly positioned to lead into the future

I. A winning business model that compounds over time


I. II. III. Customer Technology Advantage Compiling Competitive Advantage Customer Captivity

COMPETITION
DEMYSTIFIED

Competition Demystified, Bruce Greenwald


"The most powerful competitive advantages arise when customer captivity is combined with economies of scale."

II. The underlying economics highlight the presence of significant entry barriers




III. Sustained market share highlights structural dominance, which underpins pricing power and signals strong switching barriers

Market Share of Data Center Accelerators (%)




NVIDIA GPU Pricing Across Architectures (US\$)



Skilled Human Capital


While the market sees chips, NVIDIA invests where few look: In the people who make the future possible

I. Jensen's long-term vision is grounded in identifying unmet needs early, and deliberately building the infrastructure to meet them before others even recognize the gap




II. NVIDIA's long executive tenure quietly drives an execution edge rivals can't match

Average executive tenure (Years)



III. Beyond leadership, NVIDIA's skilled workforce makes execution its core strength







It's Still Early Days for Al


Al has already achieved unprecedented global penetration, and the biggest wave of growth is still ahead


I. Al is scaling faster than any technology in history, and it's only getting smarter, more capable, and more deeply embedded across every layer of the global economy





II. AI is still in its early stages, and today's investments are building the foundation for exponential future value creation across the global economy









NVIDIA: Best Positioned to Capture the AI Future


No other company is as well positioned as NVIDIA to capture the AI boom and absorb hyperscaler CapEx

I. NVIDIA is the best-positioned company to capture the AI growth cycle, as evidenced by its strong revenue acceleration and increasing share of Big Techs' CapEx




II. No other company turns AI demand into economic value as effectively as NVIDIA





III. NVIDIA is priced as an AI company, data center drives nearly all of its value





Hyperscalers CapEx Forecast


Al is reshaping infrastructure priorities, hyperscalers are rapidly scaling CapEx to meet compute demand

I. Cloud and AI investments are accelerating, Hyperscalers CapEx to grow at 13% CAGR




II. Rising compute needs are triggering massive CapEx expansion across Hyperscalers

Why Are Hyperscalers Ramping Up CapEx?



III. Most CapEx now flows into data centers, highlighting their role in Hyperscaler growth


CAPEX destined for Data Center




Data Center Revenue Build Up

NVIDIA is uniquely positioned to capitalize on rising AI accelerator demand, and our projections reflect that upside


I. Hyperscalers are allocating more to GPUs, driven by the AI shift in data centers




II. NVIDIA Leads Hyperscaler GPU CapEx, Even as Share Slightly Declines



III. As the hyperscalers' share declines, we backsolve to reach total revenue




IV. Our projections exceed consensus, driven by accelerated AI infrastructure growth



Is our Desired IRR Viable? Yes!

For a company of such high quality, we believe there is ample room to allocate capital and generate a satisfactory return


I. We are exiting at a 2029 forward multiple equivalent to pre-AI years. Additionally, we conducted a reverse P/E analysis, which reinforced our decision within a satisfactory IRR



II. With a multiple premium to the sector well below historical averages—especially when compared to peers of significantly lower quality—we believe this is a compelling entry point

| Required P/E Analysis | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Senna's Revenue CAGR: 24% | | | | | | | | |
| | Revenue CAGR | | | | | | | |
| | | 15% | 20% | 25% | 30% | 35% | 40% | 45% |
| IRR | Min: 15% | 34x | 27x | 22x | 18x | 15x | 12x | 10x |
| | Base: 20% | 39x | 31x | 25x | 21x | 17x | 14x | 12x |
| | Bull: 30% | 44x | 35x | 29x | 23x | 19x | 16x | 13x |
| | | _ | | | | | | |

The P/E ratio has exceeded 25x in 83% of the weeks over the past 10 years



Risks and Scenarios

From Opportunity to Threat: Mapping the IRR Upside and Stress-Testing the Core Risks

I. Mapping IRR Potential Across Bear, Base, and Bull AI Outlooks

IRR Scenarios Analysis


| | Bear | Base | Bull |
|------------------------------------|-------|------|------|
| Marginal CapEx to Data Center (%) | 70% | 80% | 90% |
| CapEx destined to Accelerators (%) | 50% | 60% | 70% |
| NVIDIA GPU Market Share (%) | 70% | 80% | 90% |
| Gross Margin | 65% | 75% | 80% |
| Exit Multiple | 15x | 28x | 35x |
| IRR | (14%) | 23% | 35% |

II. Stress Testing the Thesis: How Core Risks Could Break the Upside

IRR Scenario Analysis of Key Risks

| ASICs CHIP | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | |
|------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|--|
| NVIDIA Market Share (%) | 55% | 65% | 75% | |
| Gross Margin (%) | 60% | 60% 65% | | |
| IRR | 3% | 3% 9% | | |
| Slow Down in Al Investments | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | |
| Marginal CapEx to Data Center (%) | 40% | 50% | 60% | |
| | | | 450/ | |
| CapEx destined to Accelerators (%) | 35% | 40% | 45% | |

III. Risk Matrix: Identifying the Most Impactful Threats to NVIDIA's Upside




| Sector | Macro |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Asics Chip | M1 China Invades Taiwan |
| S2 Hardware Competi | ion Economic Deceleration Risk |
| DeepSeek V2 Efficie | nt Slowdown in Al Investments |




Case in a Nutshell

NVDA: We are Long!



Exit Multiple: 28x p

IRR Breakdown



We are open for Q&A!



Presentation Index

Long NVIDIA

NVIDIA at a glance

Ecosystem

GPUs:NVIDIA's Main Product

MOAT I: Ahead in GPU Technology

MOAT II: NVLink Scale Capabilities

MOAT III: Software Switching Costs

Competitive Advantage

Management

Skilled Human Capital

Capture Al Market

It's Still Early Days for Al

NVIDIA: Best Positioned to to Capture the Al Future

Hyperscalers CapEx Forecast

Data Center Revenue Build-Up

Valuation

Is our Desired IRR Viable? Yes!

Risks and Scenarios

Case in a Nutshell

Our Conversations:

Call 1 – Guilherme Amaral | Kinea

Call 2 - Jon Y | Asianometry

Call 3 – José Moreira PRAGMA

Call 4 - Gabriel Oliveira Verde Asset

Call 5 - João Pedro Freitas | Mainú

Call 6 - Ilan Crohmal Occam

Call 7 – Karina Fugita | GeoCapital

Call 8 – Caio Bessa M Square

Call 9 - Lucas Dias | Aster Capital

Call 10 – Igor Fernandes | AZ Quest

Call 11 – Adriano Marques | Ascenty

Appendix Index

Data Center Investments

Stargate: The New Race for Al Infrastructure

Data center Demand

Multiple Rationale

- I. Rationale Behind Our Exit Multiple
 Assumption
- II. Rationale Behind Our Exit Multiple

 <u>Assumption</u>

Risks

DeepSeek Day Jevons Paradox

- I. DeepSeek x GPT-40. Who is Better?
- II. DeepSeek x GPT-40. Who is Better?
- III. DeepSeek x GPT-40. Who is Better?

And in the end, who was Better, DeepSeek or GPT-40?

Can Energy be a risk for Al?

- I. Risk: Slowdown in Al Investments
- II. Risk: Slowdown in Al Investments

Value Generation With Al

Build-Up Sanity Check | Goldman Sachs

Build-Up Sanity Check | Dell'Oro

Build-Up Sanity Check | AMD

Build-Up Sanity Check | McKinsey

- I. Al Bubble
- II. Al Bubble

Key-man Risk

How Could This Investment Lose Money?

NVIDIA

I. Robotics

II. Robotics
Current Overview
ARM
Ampere Computing
What Happened in NVIDIA Margin in 2022
Value Added
Shareholder Structure
Performance Metrics & Goals

Inputs

Marginal CapEx
How Marginal CapEx Reflects in our Model?

GPUs Share
How GPU's Share reflects in our Model?

Hyperscalers % of Revenue
Ex-Hyperscalers % of Revenue
How Hyperscalers Share Reflects in our Model?

Competition

AMD at a Glance
ASICs at a Glance
Unconvincing Playbook
AI Rush Isn't Making It Any Easier
How Does This Translate into our Model?
What if they introduced better software than
CUDA?

Is NVDIA the Best Investment in Semiconductors? ROIC Comparison

Geopolitical

Chinas as an Opportunity
China x Taiwan

Why Taiwan is so Important to NVIDIA? TSMC
A Powerful Alliance Between Chip Design and
Manufactuturing Leaders
Trade War: Direct Impact on NVIDIA

DCF

Why not DCF?
FCFF Valuation
FCFE Valuation
DCF Scenarios
WACC
Perpetuity Growth

Senna x Consensus

Where we Disagree with the Consensus?

Supply Analysis

Gross Margin

EBIT Margin

Net Margin

Sequoia Paper

Model

NVIDIA's Revenue
NVIDIA Total Revenue 2010–2024
NVIDIA Data Center Revenue 2010–2024
NVIDIA Projected Total Revenue
NVIDIA Projected Data Center Revenue
NVIDIA Revenue per Segment (%)
NVIDIA Revenue per Segment (US\$)
NVIDIA Projected Margin

Phase 2 | Presentation

Data Center Investments

Stargate: The New Race for AI Infrastructure

With up to \$500B in investments, OpenAI, SoftBank, and Oracle are building the global backbone of generative intelligence





Stargate is a \$500B initiative by OpenAI, SoftBank, Oracle, and MGX to build Al-focused data centers across the globe. It aims to secure large-scale compute for training advanced models and supporting national AI strategies, starting in Texas and the UAE

How Nvidia can win with Stargate?

1. Massive GPU sales

Stargate will require hundreds of thousands of high-end AI chips, and NVIDIA is the dominant supplier. Oracle, a key partner in Stargate, has already committed to purchasing up to \$40 billion worth of NVIDIA GPUs to power the initial U.S. data centers

2. Software and Licensing

Beyond hardware, NVIDIA earns recurring revenue from its AI frameworks, and proprietary tools, which are essential for training and deploying models at scale. Stargate's reliance on these tools further locks in revenue

Sam Altman, CEO at OpenAl

"We believe Stargate will become the foundational infrastructure for the future of artificial intelligence, not just to train more powerful models, but to ensure they are developed safely, aligned with human values, and accessible to the world's democracies"






Data Center Demand

Market valuations increasingly hinge on expectations of sustained, AI-driven data center demand

Dell'oro projections McKinsey Projections







Multiple Rationale

I. Rationale Behind Our Exit Multiple Assumption


I. Historical data shows the current multiple is well below previous averages



II. The current premium to the sector is well below historical averages



III. NVIDIA's exceptional earnings growth justifies its P/E multiple






II. Rationale Behind Our Exit Multiple Assumption

Although we believe the AI boom still has much room to unfold, we used a conservative assumption for our multiple, based on a normalized moment for the company



In addition to using a conservative multiple, we believe the company may still unlock new revenue streams — such as through Robotics — which could trigger a new wave of growth



Monetization Opportunities through Robotics

NVIDIA is betting on robotics as its next growth engine, monetizing through Isaac (software licensing) and Omniverse + Cosmos (realistic and scalable simulation). These platforms expand its reach beyond hardware, targeting a trillion-dollar market.

Isaac Platform: A comprehensive framework for the development, simulation, and deployment of autonomous robots. Revenue comes from software licensing and integration.

Simulation with Omniverse: High-fidelity environment simulation for virtual robot training, powered by a precise physics engine and integrated with the NVIDIA Cosmos platform for scalable deployment.

Jensen Hung, Nvidia's Founder & CEO


"I think this is likely to be the next multi-trillion-dollar industry."



2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040

21.000

Sector Multiples






Risks

DeepSeek Day

DeepSeek's rapid ascent challenges incumbents, raising questions about model openness, security, and competitive stability

I. DeepSeek's 9x lower cost exposes Big Tech's monetization fragility




https://www.the-sun.com/tech/13396198/nvidia-most-valuable-company-loses-billions



CHIPS ARE DOWN:

World's most valuable company making AI chips loses \$600bn in biggest market loss EVER after China's DeepSeek launch

II. DeepSeek breaks the parameter-performance tradeoff



III. DeepSeek fizzled due to hype, mistrust, and no global play

Inflated Benchmarks

Initial performance was overhyped, based on self-reported metrics with little third-party validation

Lack of Ecosystem

No strong APIs, enterprise integration, or developer community like OpenAI or Anthropic

Trust Issues

Concerns around alignment, safety, and transparency limited adoption outside China

No Global Strategy


Without a clear international presence or monetization plan, DeepSeek remains locally constrained




Jevons Paradox


DeepSeek V2 and NVIDIA's GPU efficiency lower inference costs, but in Jevons' logic, this only accelerates total GPU demand

I. Explaining the Jevons Paradox: Why Efficiency Can Drive More Consumption



II. DeepSeek V2's efficiency could lower inference costs, potentially expanding AI adoption and increasing GPU demand





"The adoption of energy-efficient AI models like DeepSeek AI is expected to influence the long-term demand for GPUs in various industries"




DeepSeek x GPT-4o. Who is Better?

We did this analysis in three steps. **Easy questions**, medium question and hard questions

Question 1: Quem é o CEO da NVIDIA?







Time: GPT Better Response: Equal

Question 3: Quantos continentes existem no planeta Terra?






Time: GPT Better Response: Equal

Question 2: O que significa a sigla "GPU"?





Time: 4 seconds and 76 thousandths

Time: GPT Better Response: DeepSeek Better

Question 4: O que é inteligência artificial?





Time: GPT Better Response: Equal




DeepSeek x GPT-4o. Who is Better?

We did this analysis in three steps. Easy questions, medium question and hard questions

Question 1: Explique a diferença entre machine learning supervisionado e não supervisionado





Question 2: Como a arquitetura CUDA contribui para o desempenho das GPUs da NVIDIA?





Time: GPT Better
Response: GPT Better

Response: GPT Better

Question 3: Compare os modelos de linguagem GPT-4 e LLaMA-2 em termos de arquitetura





Question 4: Quais são os principais fatores que afetam a inflação em uma economia?

Time: GPT Better

Response: DeepSeek Better





Time: GPT Better Response: Equal

DeepSeek x GPT-4o. Who is Better?

We did this analysis in three steps. Easy questions, medium question and hard questions

Question 1: Avalie criticamente os desafios éticos do uso de LLMs em ambientes corporativos





Question 2: Como a dependência da cadeia de suprimentos de semicondutores impacta a geopolítica entre EUA e China?





Time: GPT Better Response: Equal

Question 3: Proponha uma arquitetura escalável para um data center otimizado para inferência de IA





Question 4: Qual é a relação entre o fim da Lei de Moore e a ascensão do modelo de computação acelerada da NVIDIA?

Time: GPT Better

Response: GPT Better






Time: GPT Better
Response: GPT Better

Time: GPT Better Response: GPT Better


And in the end, who was better, DeepSeek or GPT-4o?

A Final Comparison Between DeepSeek and GPT-40



Can Energy be a Risk for AI?


Rising power demands may challenge scalability and sustainability of AI growth




I. Risk: Slowdown in Al Investments

Inference Is the New Bottleneck, Reinforcing the Need for Continued AI Investment


I. Generative AI Adoption Is Scaling Faster Than Any Prior Technology



III. User Growth is Exploding — Fueling Persistent Inference Demand



II. No Signs of Slowdown: AI Models Keep Getting Larger and Heavier



IV. Why Inference Will Keep Growing — With or Without New Training Breakthroughs

Drivers Behind the Exponential Growth of AI Inference Demand





Jensen Hung, Nvidia's Founder & CEO


"With the rise of inference-based AI, compute requirements have already increased by $100 \times -$ and as reasoning models advance, inference will become one of the main drivers of AI infrastructure demand"



II. Risk: Slowdown in Al Investments


Adoption curves from past tech giants show ChatGPT's growth is still in its early stages


I. Google's Growth Trajectory Shows That ChatGPT's Expansion Is Likely Just Beginning



Google took over a decade to reach 1 billion users — but its real scale came afterward: daily searches grew from 3.3 billion in 2012 to 13.6 billion in 2025, more than 4× growth even with a mature user base. ChatGPT, by contrast, reached 100 million users in just 2 months and is projected to hit 800 million monthly active users in under three years. Despite its record-breaking adoption, we believe — just like with Google — the biggest growth is still ahead, both in user base and in daily engagement per user.

II. What took Instagram a decade, ChatGPT may achieve in just a few years





While most platforms take years to gain traction, ChatGPT reached 100 million users in just 2 months — a milestone that took Instagram years to approach. Three years in, ChatGPT has already hit 800 million users, signaling not just fast adoption, but a potential structural shift in how quickly transformative technologies scale. Looking at Instagram's trajectory, it took 5 years after reaching 100 million to hit 1 billion users, and over a decade to surpass 2.16 billion. If ChatGPT maintains even part of this trajectory, the implications for future scale are massive



Value Generation with Al

Real-World Impact and What's Next: How Leading Companies Are Embedding AI at Scale

I. Al Is Already Delivering Tangible Business Value Across Industries

Real Value Generation seen on Companies

| | Al Use Case | Results |
|------------------|--|---|
| amazon | AI-powered recommendation engine | +35% of revenue from personalized suggestions |
| Goldman Sachs | Generative AI for internal code generation | 40% faster delivery of internal tools |
| Walmart > ' | AI for demand forecasting and inventory management | +10% inventory efficiency, \$1B in savings |
| SIEMENS | Al-based predictive maintenance in equipment | 30% reduction in unplanned downtime |

II. Using AI Is No Longer Optional, It's a Standard in High-Performance Cultures

Case Study: DuoLingo

Shopify Sent Internal Memo Making AI Usage Mandatory for All Employees

"Using AI effectively is now a fundamental expectation of everyone at Shopify." "Before asking for more headcount, teams must demonstrate why they cannot get things done using AI."


Case Study: Shopify

Duolingo's CEO Luis von Ahn issued an internal memo declaring that Duolingo is becoming an Al company


"Duolingo is going to be Al-first." "Al use will be part of what we evaluate in performance reviews." "We'd rather move with urgency and take small hits on quality than move slowly and miss the moment."

III. Global Enterprises Are Prioritizing GenAl to Transform Revenue and Cost Structures

GenAl Improvements Targeted for Global Enterprises over the next 2 years (2024)











Goldman Sachs





II. We project an excpected NVIDIA Market Share to go from 88% in 2025 to 80% in 2029



2027E


2025E

2026E


2028E

2029E

Dell'oro




AMD





McKinsey



2026E

2025E

2027E

2028E

2029E

2025E

2026E

2027E

2028E

2029E

I. Al Bubble

Using historical and economic factors, we conclude that NVIDIA is not in a bubble

I. Although it varies greatly, the indicated semiconductor cycle length is 27 months

Semiconduc


Extraordinary semiconductor cycle iriggered by one-lime events, cyclical and geopolitical effects where the cycle is a cycle of the cyc

Semiconductor business cycles

| | | Length in | Sales | s in % |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| Trough | Peak | months | Trough-to-peak | Peak-to-trough |
| Oct 1998 | Dec 2000 | 26.0 | 92.7 | -46.3 |
| Apr 2002 | Mar 2005 | 35.0 | 90.0 | -5.3 |
| Jul 2005 | Oct 2008 | 38.0 | 28.3 | -39.0 |
| Aug 2009 | May 2011 | 21.0 | 85.7 | -9.2 |
| May 2013 | Jan 2015 | 20.0 | 29.9 | -9.3 |
| Aug 2016 | Nov 2018 | 27.0 | 62.7 | -23.0 |
| | Average | 27.7 | 64.9 | -22.0 |

II. With AI, the cycle has lasted 48 months with no signs of stopping






III. Moreover, the company's multiples are below the historical average



IV. Not only that, but it has also been generating cash





II. AI Bubble

Using historical and economic factors, we conclude that NVIDIA is not in a bubble

I. We had the opportunity to attend Damodaran's lecture on his short position in AI






AI'S WINNERS, LOSERS AND WANNABES: BEYOND BUZZ WORDS!, April 2024


We had the opportunity to attend Aswath Damodaran's lecture on the AI bubble and his expectations for NVIDIA in 2024 at Insper

III. Technological disruption creates new growth paradigms, leading to massive errors




II. Damodaran's projections used a 15% CAGR for AI





IV. Moreover, NVIDIA's market dominance was underestimated

NVIDIA's Market Share (%)





Key-man Risk

Although led by a single man, we do not see this as a risk due to his continued and extreme willingness to remain with the company


I. Despite being 62 years old, Jensen still upholds his culture of excellence and has never shown any sign of leaving the company



Jensen Huang, 62 years, NVIDIA CEO & Founder

"I work from the moment I wake up to the moment I go to bed, and I work seven days a week. When I'm not working, I'm thinking about working"


"When I'm not working, I'm thinking about working, and when I'm working, I'm working. I sit through movies, but I don't remember them because I'm thinking about work"



II. Jensen remains deeply involved through his "Top 5 email" culture and direct oversight of 60+ executives, showing his continued intensity at NVIDIA

Top-5 things culture Organizational Structure








How Could This Investment Lose Money?

In a scenario where AI products are not monetized, we see a possibility of losing money

I. We are highly exposed to data center revenue, which is directly tied to AI development

Projected revenue per segment



III. If AI fails to create value, investments would drop and pricing power would decline


Consequences of not creating value



Therefore, we arrive at bear case assumptions by zeroing out marginal investment in AI and reducing margins to pre-AI levels at 65%

II. Applications may face a supply that exceeds demand

Sequoia's AI thesis



Risk of AI Platform Saturation and Commoditization

If many companies offer similar AI platforms, it could trigger price wars, margin compression, and commoditization, making it harder to recover the heavy investments in GPUs and data centers

IV. We assume steady 2024 capex and lower gross margin going forward

Sensitivity Analysis

| ٠ | | | | N | /larginal Capex (% | 6) | | |
|--------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.0% | 10.0% | 20.0% | 30.0% | 40.0% | 50.0% | 60.0% |
| _ | 60.0% | -12.9% | -9.0% | -5.5% | -2.1% | 1.0% | 3.9% | 6.7% |
| % | 62.5% | -11.3% | -7.4% | -3.8% | -0.4% | 2.8% | 5.8% | 8.6% |
| gi | 65.0% | (-9.8%) | -5.9% | -2.2% | 1.3% | 4.5% | 7.6% | 10.5% |
| Margin | 67.5% | -8.4% | -4.4% | -0.6% | 2.9% | 6.2% | 9.3% | 12.3% |
| SS | 70.0% | -7.0% | -2.9% | 0.9% | 4.5% | 7.8% | 11.0% | 14.0% |
| Gross | 72.5% | -5.7% | -1.5% | 2.4% | 6.0% | 9.4% | 12.7% | 15.7% |
| | 75.0% | -4.3% | -0.1% | 3.9% | 7.5% | 11.0% | 14.3% | 17.4% |

In a scenario where AI fails to generate enough value to drive marginal investments, we would see an IRR of -10%



NVIDIA

Robotics I

A New Revenue Stream Emerging Beyond GPUs, Robotics Could Be NVIDIA's Next Growth Engine

I. Understanding Robotics — Applications Across Industries and the Measurable Economic Impact Already Being Delivered

What is robotics and What is used for?

Robotics enables the automation of physical tasks across industries — from manufacturing and logistics to healthcare and services — by combining AI with mechanical systems to perform repetitive or complex activities

Industrial automation: assembly lines, logistics, semiconductor fabs



Warehouse & retail: picking, sorting, restocking



Healthcare: patient support, hospital delivery



Consumer services: cleaning, elderly care, personal assistance



General-purpose humanoids: designed to eventually perform everyday human tasks

amazon

-25% in operating costs

Up to US\$ 10B/year projected savings

150→600 items/hour (×3.5)

-40% defects

150 → 600 labor costs

+15% efficiency;
-40% defects

-40% defects

II. New Companies and Capital Are Fueling What Could Become a Trillion-Dollar Robotics Market — With Strategic Investments Already Underway from Tech and Industry Leaders

New Companies and Investments



Atlas – Boston Dynamics

- Hyundai invested \$21 billion in partnership with Boston Dynamics, including the backbone for the production and deployment of robots like Atlas




Figure 01 - Figure AI

- NVIDIA invested approximately \$50 million in Figure AI, reinforcing its strategy to expand embedded AI in robotics
- Ambitious production target: up to 200,000 robots delivered by 2029



Optimus - Tesla

- Mass production of thousands of units is expected to begin in 2025, with plans to scale to 1 million units per year by the end of the decade
- "Optimus has the potential to be more significant than the car business long term" Elon Musk



Robotics Industry (US\$ million)

2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040



Robotics II

A New Revenue Stream Emerging Beyond GPUs, Robotics Could Be NVIDIA's Next Growth Engine

I. Robotics Runs on Compute — And NVIDIA Provides the Performance and Platforms to Make It Real

Why Robots Need GPUs?

Modern robots must interpret complex sensor data, make real-time decisions, and interact with the physical world — all of which require high-throughput, low-latency AI inference

What Does GPU enable the Robot to do?



See: Computer Vision



Think: AI models for reasoning and planning



Act: Real-time control and movement

NVIDIA Robotics Products



2023 Designed for entry-level Robots





Jetson AGX Orin

US\$ 1,500 2024 Designed for High performance Robots



Jetson AGX Thor

~US\$ 3,000 Expected for 2025 Designed for Humanoids Robots

II. NVIDIA's Full-Stack Strategy to Monetize the Growing Robotics Market, Building a Developer-Led Ecosystem Like It Did with CUDA in AI

NVIDIA Platforms to monetize Robotics

Isaac Platform

NVIDIA Isaac is a modular platform for developing, simulating, and deploying autonomous robots, combining AI perception, planning, and control in one stack

Omniverse

Omniverse enables realistic, physics-based simulation of robots in virtual environments, accelerating training and testing before real-world deployment

Cosmos

Cosmos is a cloud platform for monitoring and managing robot fleets — allowing updates, orchestration, and real-time operations at scale

Isaac Platform



S FIGURE Boston Dynamics — 4

> Microsoft amazon

NVIDIA's Clients

Omniverse

Cosmos

Jensen Hung, Nvidia's Founder & CEO

"I think this is likely to be the next multi-trillion-dollar industry



Current Overview

NVIDIA is already delivering a product roadmap to establish itself as the AI fabric

I. Despite its explosive progress, the company continues to increase product performance exponentially, with an extreme leap in the Rubin architecture

Rubin Ultra NVL144

Second Half 2026

3.3x GB300 NVL72

13 TB/s HBM4 75TB Fast Memory **1.6x**

260 TBs NVLink6

2x

Rubin Ultra NVL576


Second Half 2027

14x GB300 NVL72


4.6 PB/s HBM4e 365TB Fast Memory **8x**


1.5 PBs NVLink7

8x



II. Having aligned its roadmap, the company is moving decisively across compute, networking, and software to cement its role as the cornerstone of the AI revolution








Arm

Acquiring ARM strengthens NVIDIA's positioning by uniting architectural control, product optimization, and recurring global revenue

I. ARM Designs the Brains of Modern Chips — Powering Billions of Devices and Generating Scalable, Recurring Revenue Through Licensing and Royalties

ARM designs CPU architectures and licenses them to companies like Apple, NVIDIA, and Amazon. These companies use ARM's designs to build chips that power smartphones, servers, cars, and IoT devices. ARM earns revenue through licensing fees and royalties



II. Acquiring ARM Strengthens NVIDIA's Full-Stack Technological Control — While Unlocking Recurring, Scalable Revenue Through Global Licensing and Royalties

NVIDIA Blackwell Ultra GPU

NVIDIA Grace CPU (Arm-Based)

Cuda + NVLink


Verticalization

GB200 NVL72

~US\$3,000,000
Expected for 2025
Designed for generative Al

Advantages

- Optimization between CPU and GPU
- Full Control of the Technology Stack
- Lower IP Licesing Costs
- Reduced Dependency on Third Parties




New Revenue Stream




Ampere Computing

Acquiring Ampere gives NVIDIA CPU control, enables full-stack AI optimization, and expands data center value capture


I. Ampere's Value Chain and Strategic Positioning in the Transition Toward Arm-Based Cloud Infrastructure







Ampere Altra Max
Custom Arm-based CPU
Clients: Oracle, Equinix, HPE
2025
Designed for Hyperscalers and Al

II. Strategic Fit: How Ampere Fills NVIDIA's CPU Gap and Accelerates Its Vision for Full-Stack AI Infrastructure







By combining NVIDIA GPUs, Ampere Arm-based CPUs, and its proprietary CUDA software + NVLink interconnect, NVIDIA is moving toward a fully vertically integrated AI computing platform


Advantages

Verticalization

- End-to-end performance gains
- Less dependency on Intel/AMD
- Greater value per system (hardware + software)
- Faster rollout of AI/HPC/cloud chips
- Tighter ecosystem with stronger competitive edge



What happened in Nvidia Margin in 2022



Gross margin for fiscal year 2023 declined from a year ago, driven by \$2.17 billion of inventory charges largely relating to excess supply of NVIDIA Ampere architecture Gaming and Data Center products as compared to the demand expectations for these products, particularly for the expected demand in China. The inventory charges were comprised of \$1.04 billion for inventory on hand and \$1.13 billion for inventory purchase obligations in excess of our demand expectations

NVIDIA 10-K 2023FY Q4

Firsts restriction to China



Value Added

How we conducted value added account

| Unit: US\$ Milion | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| | |
| X Nvidia Price Today (04/06/2025) | |
| | |
| Price today | 139,99 |
| Shares | 24.400 |
| Nvidia Market Cap | 3.415.756 |
| | |
| Total Debt | 8.463 |
| Total Cash | 43.210 |
| Net Debt | (34.747) |
| | |

| х | Revenue by segment in 2024 | |
|---|----------------------------|--------|
| | | |
| | Gaming | 11.350 |
| | Professional visualization | 1.878 |
| | Automotive | 1.694 |
| | OEM & Others | 389 |
| | | |


| EV/Sales Multilple | |
|----------------------------|----------|
| Gaming | 4,38x |
| AMD | 6,95x |
| Sony | 1,80x |
| Professional visualization | 8,88x |
| Autodesk | 10,30x |
| Dassault Systems | 7,44x |
| PTC | 8,91x |
| Automotive | 5,52x |
| Mobileye | 7,35x |
| Qualcomm | 3,69x |
| OEM & Others | 16,21x |
| Broadcomm | 22,50x |
| Marvell Tech | 9,91x |
| Core Value - Net Debt | |
| Gaming | 49.656 |
| Professional visualization | 16.683 |
| Automotive | 9.351 |
| OEM & Others | 6.304 |
| Core Value | 81.994 |
| Net Debt | (34.747) |
| Core - Net Debt | 116.741 |

| Oata center + Adjacenses Value Added | 3.299.015 |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|
| | |
| | 96,6% |
| | |
| Oata Center EV/Sales | 28,34x |



Shareholder structure

Shareholder Structure





Performance Metrics & Goals

Fiscal 2025 performance metrics and goals for NEO pay were as set forth below:

| PERFORMANCE METRICS | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Variable Cash Plan | SY PSUs | MY PSUs | | | | |
| Metric | Revenue | Non-GAAP Operating Income | TSR relative to the S&P 500 | | | | |
| Timeframe | 1 year | 1 year | 3 years | | | | |
| CC's Rationale for Metric | Drives value, contributes to Company's long-term success | Drives value, contributes to Company's long-term success | Aligns directly with long-term shareholder value creation | | | | |
| | Focuses on growth in new and existing markets | Reflects our annual revenue generation and effective operating | Provides comparison of our stock price performance, including | | | | |
| | Distinct, separate metric from Non- | expense management | dividends, against a capital market index in which we compete | | | | |
| | GAAP Operating Income | Distinct, separate metrics from revenue | Relative performance goal accounts for macroeconomic factors impacting the market | | | | |

| PERFORMANCE GOALS | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|--|---|--|---|--|
| | Variable Cash Plan | | SYI | PSUs | MY PSUs | | |
| | Fiscal 2025 Revenue | Payout as a % of Target Opportunity (1) | Fiscal 2025 Non- GAAP Operating Income (2) | Shares Eligible to Vest as a % of Target Opportunity (1) | Fiscal 2025 to 2027 3-Year Relative TSR (3) | Shares Eligible to Vest as a % of Target Opportunity (1) | |
| Threshold | \$45.0 billion | 50% | \$16.0 billion | 50% | 25th percentile | 25% | |
| Base Compensation Plan | \$90.0 billion | 100% | \$56.0 billion | 100% | 50th percentile | 100% | |
| Stretch Compensation Plan . | \$110.0 billion | 200% | \$72.0 billion | CEO 150% Other NEOs 200% | 75th percentile | CEO 150% Other NEOs 200% | |




Inputs


Marginal Capex


With the AI race underway, companies are allocating the majority of their marginal capex to Data Center's

I. The abnormal growth in CapEx signals an acceleration of investments in AI. This clearly indicates a strategic shift by big tech companies toward the new wave of innovation



II. Everyone is allocating incremental capital to AI, and NVIDIA is already seeing the impact in its revenue








How Marginal Capex reflects in our Model?

Data Center-focused Capex supports robust returns across a wide range of scenarios

I. For the following years, we assumed that the majority of marginal capex would be allocated to Data Centers, as indicated by the hyperscalers



Marginal Capex destined to Data center (US\$ Million)



II. When performing a sensitivity analysis, we found that in the vast majority of cases we still achieve a satisfactory IRR, which provides us with a margin of safety

IRR Sensitivity Analysis IRR Sensitivity Analysis

| | | Marginal Capex (%) | | | | | | |
|------------|-------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% |
| <u>»</u> _ | 45.0% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 11.8% | 13.1% | 14.3% | 15.5% | 16.7% |
| Сарех | 50.0% | 12.8% | 14.2% | 15.5% | 16.8% | 18.1% | 19.4% | 20.6% |
| ຶ່ | 55.0% | 16.2% | 17.6% | 19.0% | 20.4% | 21.7% | 23.0% | 24.3% |
| ţ | 60.0% | 19.4% | 20.9% | 22.3% | 23.8% | 25.1% | 26.5% | 27.8% |
| era | 65.0% | 22.5% | 24.0% | 25.5% | 27.0% | 28.4% | 29.8% | 31.2% |
| ccel | 70.0% | 25.4% | 27.0% | 28.5% | 30.1% | 31.6% | 33.0% | 34.5% |
| Ă | 75.0% | 28.2% | 29.9% | 31.5% | 33.0% | 34.6% | 36.1% | 37.6% |

| | | | | M | arginal Capex (% | 6) | | |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% |
| | 65.0% | 11.3% | 12.7% | 14.0% | 15.2% | 16.5% | 17.7% | 18.9% |
| 8 | 70.0% | 13.9% | 15.2% | 16.6% | 17.9% | 19.2% | 20.5% | 21.7% |
| Share | 75.0% | 16.3% | 17.7% | 19.1% | 20.5% | 21.8% | 23.1% | 24.4% |
| ج. | 80.0% | 18.7% | 20.1% | 21.5% | 22.9% | 24.3% | 25.7% | 27.0% |
| Ř | 85.0% | 20.9% | 22.4% | 23.9% | 25.3% | 26.7% | 28.1% | 29.5% |
| Market | 90.0% | 23.1% | 24.7% | 26.2% | 27.6% | 29.1% | 30.5% | 31.9% |
| _ | 95.0% | 25.3% | 26.8% | 28.4% | 29.9% | 31.3% | 32.8% | 34.2% |

IRR exceeded 15% in 86% of the cases


IRR exceeded 15% in 92% of the cases



GPUs Share


With the increased pricing power of GPUs, coupled with infrastructure stabilization, we believe in a rising share of overall spending

I. Today's GPU Share in AI Capex



III. But pricing power is likely to grow


NVIDIA GPU Pricing Across Architectures (US\$)



II. Unit Economics of a Data Center indicates that GPUs cost could get to 72%

| Hyperscaler capex split | Comment | % split |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------------|
| Power | Infra | 25-30% |
| Building | Infra | 10-15% |
| Cooling | Infra | 10-15% |
| Networking | Chip | 10-15% |
| Compute | Chip | 40-45%) |
| NVIDIA DGX H100 (Hardware Build Up)' | Al Server | % |
| CPU | 5,200 | |
| 8 GPU + 4 NVSwitch Baseboard | 195,000 | (72.4%) |
| Memory | 7,860 | |
| Storage | 3,456 | |
| Others | 57,494 | |
| Total Cost | 269,010 | |

IV. Microsoft's numbers already indicate a growth in the GPU share of the AI Capex mix






How GPU's Share reflects in our Model?

Rising GPU share supports investment case with solid IRR sensitivity

I. We increased the GPU share as a consequence of the companies' growing pricing power, as well as the need to replace them before the broader infrastructure

% of Hyperscalers Technology Capex (GPU Share)

Hyperscalers Accelerators TAM (US\$ Million)



II. When performing a sensitivity analysis, we found that in the vast majority of cases we still achieve a satisfactory IRR, which provides us with a margin of safety

IRR Sensitivity Analysis IRR Sensitivity Analysis

| Marginal Capex (%) | | | | | | | | | Market Share NVIDIA | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| _ | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% | | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% |
| <u>»</u> | 45.0% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 11.8% | 13.1% | 14.3% | 15.5% | 16.7% | ators Capex | 45.0% | 6.0% | 8.4% | 10.6% | 12.8% | 14.9% | 17.0% | 19.0% |
| be | 50.0% | 12.8% | 14.2% | 15.5% | 16.8% | 18.1% | 19.4% | 20.6% | | 50.0% | 9.4% | 11.8% | 14.2% | 16.5% | 18.7% | 20.9% | 23.0% |
| Accelerators Ca | 55.0% | 16.2% | 17.6% | 19.0% | 20.4% | 21.7% | 23.0% | 24.3% | | 55.0% | 12.6% | 15.2% | 17.6% | 20.0% | 22.4% | 24.6% | 26.8% |
| | 60.0% | 19.4% | 20.9% | 22.3% | 23.8% | 25.1% | 26.5% | 27.8% | | 60.0% | 15.6% | 18.3% | 20.9% | 23.4% | 25.8% | 28.1% | 30.4% |
| | 65.0% | 22.5% | 24.0% | 25.5% | 27.0% | 28.4% | 29.8% | 31.2% | <u>e</u> | 65.0% | 18.5% | 21.3% | 24.0% | 26.6% | 29.1% | 31.5% | 33.9% |
| | 70.0% | 25.4% | 27.0% | 28.5% | 30.1% | 31.6% | 33.0% | 34.5% | S | 70.0% | 21.3% | 24.2% | 27.0% | 29.7% | 32.2% | 34.7% | 37.2% |
| | 75.0% | 28.2% | 29.9% | 31.5% | 33.0% | 34.6% | 36.1% | 37.6% | ⋖ | 75.0% | 24.0% | 27.0% | 29.8% | 32.6% | 35.3% | 37.8% | 40.3% |

IRR exceeded 15% in 82% of the cases


IRR exceeded 15% in 84% of the cases



Hyperscalers % of Revenue

Sovereign AI and corporate AI are the new sources of revenue diversification for NVIDIA

I. NVIDIA's Data Center revenue is composed of 42% from the world's major hyperscalers



A Republica Tecnológica Tenológica Tenológica Tenológica Tenológica Opidica e o futuro do Oxidente Alexander C. Rarp Frinteda W. Santaka

Alexander Karp, Palantir CEO, The Technological Republic

The technologies we are creating — including innovative forms of AI that may challenge the country's current monopoly over global creative control — are themselves a product of a culture whose preservation and development we can no longer afford to neglect

III. Corporate AI is expected to grow, and NVIDIA is actively expanding in this space

FINANCIAL TIMES

Nvidia seeks to build its business beyond Big Tech


Over recent months, Nvidia has also struck alliances with suppliers, including Cisco, Dell and HP, to help sell to enterprise customers, which manage their own corporate IT infrastructure instead of outsourcing to the cloud







II. Sovereign AI will drive data center growth and increase demand for GPUs



IV. The share of hyperscalers in NVIDIA's revenue is expected to decrease by at least 2%/y

Guilherme Amaral, Kinea Global Analyst

"We expect at least a 2%/year compression over time in the contribution of CSPs to NVIDIA's revenue. This is largely driven by the rise of sovereign AI demand and the company's ability to diversify its end markets"







Ex-Hyperscalers % of Revenue

As other applications grow, hyperscalers become less relevant to total revenue


I. Hyperscalers' capex becomes relatively smaller as other applications grow




II. As a result, a large portion of total capex shifts toward other players



III. Due to lower compute needs, NVIDIA holds less share in total Data Centers



IV. Still, the growth of sovereign and enterprise AI has a strong impact






How Hyperscalers Share reflects in our Model?


Declining hyperscaler's share supports investment case with solid IRR sensitivity

I. With the rise of sovereign AI and corporate AI, we conservatively reduce the hyperscalers' share of NVIDIA's revenue by 1 percentage point annually



NVIDIA Total Revenue (US\$ Million)





II. When performing a sensitivity analysis, we found that in the vast majority of cases we still achieve a satisfactory IRR, which provides us with a margin of safety

IRR Sensitivity Analysis

IRR Sensitivity Analysis

| | | Market Share (%) | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|
| _ | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% | | |
| S | 48.0% | 6.3% | 8.6% | 10.9% | 13.1% | 15.2% | 17.3% | 19.3% | | |
| aler | 44.0% | 9.0% | 11.5% | 13.9% | 16.2% | 18.4% | 20.5% | 22.6% | | |
| rsca | 40.0% | 12.2% | 14.8% | 17.3% | (19.7%) | 22.0% | 24.2% | 26.4% | | |
| Нуре | 36.0% | 15.9% | 18.6% | 21.2% | 23.7% | 26.1% | 28.5% | 30.7% | | |
| | 32.0% | 20.2% | 23.1% | 25.8% | 28.5% | 31.0% | 33.5% | 35.9% | | |
| % of | 28.0% | 25.4% | 28.5% | 31.4% | 34.2% | 36.9% | 39.5% | 42.0% | | |
| ٥٠ | 24.0% | 31.8% | 35.1% | 38.2% | 41.2% | 44.1% | 46.9% | 49.6% | | |

| | | Marginal Capex (%) | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|
| _ | | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | 95.0% | | |
| S | 48.0% | 9.5% | 10.8% | 12.1% | 13.4% | 14.6% | 15.8% | 17.0% | | |
| ler | 44.0% | 12.5% | 13.8% | 15.1% | 16.5% | 17.7% | 19.0% | 20.2% | | |
| % of Hyperscalers | 40.0% 36.0% 32.0% 28.0% | 15.8% | 17.2% | 18.6% | (20.0%) | 21.3% | 22.6% | 23.9% | | |
| | | 19.7% | 21.2% | 22.6% | 24.1% | 25.5% | 26.8% | 28.2% | | |
| | | 24.3% | 25.8% | 27.4% | 28.9% | 30.3% | 31.8% | 33.2% | | |
| | | 29.7% | 31.4% | 33.0% | 34.6% | 36.2% | 37.7% | 39.2% | | |
| | 24.0% | 36.5% | 38.3% | 40.0% | 41.7% | 43.4% | 45.0% | 46.6% | | |

IRR exceeded 15% in 76% of the cases

Even if mantained at 40%, we would get a 20% IRR

IRR exceeded 15% in 77% of the cases

Even if mantained at 40%, we would get a 20% IRR



Competition

AMD at a Glance


The underdog in the AI revolution is starting to show signs of activity


I. Originally a CPU player, AMD entered the Data Center GPU market late, but successfully established itself as the second-largest player

1969 2006 2009 2020 2017 **Foundation Acquires** Spin-off Ryzen MI100 In CPUs **ATI Technologies** Fabs Architecure DC

Continues to operate in the CPU market for gaming, but with an increasingly strong focus on the data center segment:

Data Center Roadmap:





II. Today, the company is attempting to replicate a similar strategy it used against Intel in the CPU market, aiming to capture some of the market share held by NVIDIA





TCO Undercutting NVIDIA by pricing at approximately 30-40% lower




ROCm

Made its ROCm software stack fully open source



UALink

Spearheading the UALink Consortium alongside companies like Intel and Broadcom to create an open, vendor-neutral alternative to NVIDIA's NVLink for GPU interconnects



ASICs at a Glance

As a way to reduce dependence on NVIDIA, ASICs have been gaining traction

I. ASIC chips can deliver lower costs due to their high application-specific design

What is an ASIC Chip?



| Parallelism | Application | Architecture | Scalability |
|-------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|
| Fixed | Single-purpose | Hardware Only | Limited |

Strenght:



TCO

Lower TCO than NVIDIA GPUs due to their **simpler design and lower power consumption**. Their less complexity **enables reduced pricing** and operational costs

III. So far, Google's TPU stands as the only successful, first-mover alternative to GPUs

Case Study: Tensor Processor Unit

Google began its partnership with Broadcom in **2015** and has consistently launched new versions throughout **the past decade**

7,000\$

35,000\$

TPU


GPU

Possible by the fact that TPUs cost approximately 3.7 times less to manufacture than GPUs



II. Big techs are partnering on chip design to strengthen their competitive edge

ASICs Companies



Big Techs In-House
Google
amazon
Microsoft

Meta

IV. As big tech projects grow, ASICs have been gaining traction

ASICs Designers Revenue (US\$ Billion)

CAGR₂₀₁₉₋₂₀₂₄: 53.8%

Broadcom Marvell

Cagable Prus 6
6
85%


2020
2021
2022
2023
2024




Unconvincing Playbook

Despite ongoing efforts, it will be difficult to challenge the world's largest company in the short to medium term

I. Despite AMD's efforts to catch up to NVIDIA, its strategy has already shown weaknesses and is unlikely to significantly impact the market leader



II. In a world where the future of AI remains uncertain, the flexibility of GPUs proves essential — just as it has throughout their entire history





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|---------------------------------------|
| •, |


| | Activity | Evolves | Ramp-up | |
|------|---------------|----------|----------------------|--|
| GPU | Multi-purpose | 5x in 3y | Plug-and-play | |
| ASIC | One and only | No | Software Development | |




Al Rush Isn't Making It Any Easier

In a world where models evolve at lightning speed, everyone wants their solution delivered yesterday


I. Models are advancing at an unimaginable pace




II. NVIDIA has been able to deliver new and improved products on very short timelines



III. Today, the company still delivers the best performance



IV. With every new product release, its cost-benefit ratio improves dramatically





How does this translate into our model?

Competitors are expected to serve more niche applications, while the lion's share of the market remains with NVIDIA

I. Even compared to the success case, GPUs are growing at an even faster pace

Even the best ASICs aren't growing as fast as GPUs



Morgan Stanley, Feb 2025

"Specifically in the case of Google, we expect their purchases of NVIDIA to roughly double this year, while TPU will grow modestly. Some of that is Google's investment in enterprise cloud, but we are told that some of that is NVIDIA's very strong performance for LLM transformers even for some of the internal workloads"

II. Although unlikely to catch up, we expect them to find success in niche products

Despite that, we believe niche products will still capture some market share:



Matured Markets

Markets that mature over time can be overtaken by ASICs, just like Bitcoin mining was — especially when workloads become stable, predictable, and cost-sensitive




Corporate Clients

Not all GPU customers are hyperscalers or require ultra-high performance — AMD can take advantage of these markets by offering lower prices

III. Accordingly, our model reflects a gradual loss of market share over time, although we believe NVIDIA will remain highly dominant over the next five years

2029



2027

2028

2026

Senna's Market Share Projections (%)

Although we project a decline in share, we remain highly confident in NVIDIA's dominance over the coming years — especially in the next five, which aligns with our planned exit

| | | | Gross Margin (%) | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|--|
| | | 60.0% | 65.0% | 70.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% | 85.0% | 90.0% | | | |
| | 68.0% | 6.8% | 10.4% | 13.8% | 17.1% | 20.2% | 23.1% | 25.9% | | | |
| % | 73.0% | 9.0% | 12.8% | 16.3% | 19.6% | 22.8% | 25.8% | 28.7% | | | |
| | 78.0% | 11.3% | 15.1% | 18.7% | 22.1% | 25.3% | 28.4% | 31.3% | | | |
| Share | 83.0% | 13.4% | 17.3% | 20.9% | 24.4% | 27.7% | 30.8% | 33.8% | | | |
| Market | 88.0% | 15.4% | 19.4% | 23.1% | 26.7% | 30.0% | 33.2% | 36.3% | | | |
| | 90.0% | 16.2% | 20.2% | 24.0% | 27.6% | 30.9% | 34.2% | 37.3% | | | |
| _ | 92.0% | 17.0% | 21.0% | 24.8% | 28.4% | 31.8% | 35.1% | 38.2% | | | |

Even when stress-testing for extreme scenarios, we still find that in most cases the investment makes sense with an exit in 2026




2025

2024

What if better software than CUDA were introduced?

Can CUDA be change? We don't think so

1. Hardware Superiority



NVIDIA isn't just leading, it's setting the pace. Any challenger must deliver a clear performance leap; otherwise, users will simply keep using NVIDIA's proven platform. In this space, matching isn't enough, you have to outperform, and that bar keeps rising

2. Extreme Capital Intensity + Long Development Cycles



Building competitive hardware demands billions in R&D, manufacturing, and integration. But money alone isn't enough, development cycles take years, and by the time a rival product hits the market, NVIDIA will likely have launched its next generation. Time is a brutal adversary.

3. Transparency vs. Proprietary Innovation




Challengers often go open-source to attract developers and build credibility, but this also exposes their roadmap and timing. Meanwhile, NVIDIA moves silently and strategically, supported by a proprietary ecosystem of innovative software libraries like CUDA, TensorRT, and cuDNN. Even if someone catches up, NVIDIA is already launching what comes next



Is Nvidia the Best Investment in Semiconductors? We Think so


Why Nvidia Stands Out

Nvidia doubled its margin in 5 years while peers remained flat




By repositioning its core business around Data Centers, Nvidia not only expanded its margins but also built a more defensible and scalable foundation, and given the sustained demand for AI infrastructure, this margin strength is likely to persist

Value creation led by NVIDIA



Nvidia exposes rivals' limits with unmatched scale, efficiency, and returns



Why we prefer NVIDIA than the others?

Nvidia scales with agility and high profitability, while TSMC relies on capital-intensive expansion, facing operational rigidity and diminishing returns


While TSMC excels in manufacturing efficiency, Nvidia captures greater value by delivering integrated solutions, resulting in consistently higher operating margins

Nvidia's model is more robust, combining control over design and software to act as a pricing maker, while competitors remain constrained by price pressure and external dependencies

Nvidia sits at the most strategic point of the semiconductor value chain, where architecture, software, and integration converge, enabling it to shape outcomes and capture outsized value



ROIC Comparison






Geopolitical

China as an Opportunity

Once considered a risk, China now presents itself as an opportunity in the company's price action

I. Historically, revenue from China has accounted for one-fifth of NVIDIA's total revenue



II. The sanctions have always been followed by NVIDIA's swift countermeasures



With the DeepSeek Day on January 27, 2025, the **U.S. government became much more cautious** and increased sanctions

III. After multiple sanctions, NVIDIA currently finds itself in a position where it exports no products to Chinese soil. As such, any positive developments now represent an opportunity

The market no longer expects any revenue from China

Morgan Stanley

BANK OF AMERICA

JPMorganChase

All major sell-side analysts covering NVIDIA have now reduced their China revenue estimates to zero

Nevertheless, any positive developments would be beneficial for the company

World[^] Business[^] Markets[^] Legal[^] Commentary[^] REUTERS

EXCLUSIVE:


Nvidia to launch cheaper **Blackwell AI chip for China** after US export curbs, sources say

Now, any new developments within China are seen as opportunities for NVIDIA, no longer as risks



China x Taiwan

From shelling to silicon: a flashpoint still inches from war



II. What are the current tensions like?

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-10/china-sends-two-aircraft-carriers-into-pacific-ocean-in-a-first "China Sends Two Aircraft Carriers Into Pacific Ocean in a First, marking an unprecedented show of naval reach and raising security concerns for Taipei, Tokyo and Washington"

Bloomberg

TIMES

https://braziljournal.com/guerra-de-trump-contra-a-china-abate-a-nvidia/

III. What we can expect for the future? Just status quo

We believe the island of Taiwan will remain as it is today, and tensions will gradually subside



- If they were to fail, a setback of this magnitude, with extremely high economic and military costs, could destabilize the Communist Party itself, a political risk that deters Beijing
- 2. CSIS wargames show China comes up short in most invasion scenarios
- 3. Crossing the strait and holding Taiwan would be extremely difficult, especially with U.S. and Japanese forces stepping in




Why Taiwan is so Important to NVDIA? TSMC

Because the world's most advanced chips still come from 100 miles off China's coast

I. TSMC's revenue boom is powered by advanced nodes, with 5nm and 3nm alone driving nearly half of all sales in 2024


Is the world's top chipmaker, producing advanced semiconductors (5nm, 3nm) for companies like Nvidia and Apple. Based in Taiwan, it supplies over 90% of the world's cuttingedge chips, making it vital to Al and global tech



II. TSMC's reliance on HPC makes Nvidia not just a client — but a vulnerability

NVIDIA Segment 46% 6% 6% 4% HPC Smartphones IoT Automotive DCE & Others

III. A dominant monopoly in advanced semiconductor foundry




With 90% of <7nm chips coming from TSMC, the world has effectively outsourced cutting-edge computing to a single, vulnerable island

A Powerful Alliance Between Chip Design and Manufacturing Leaders

Nvidia and TSMC define the frontier of semiconductors


I. Nvidia's rise in AI is inseparable from its decades-long dependence on TSMC's most advanced nodes



II. TSMC is scaling CoWoS fast to meet Nvidia's AI demand

70,000 38,000 2023 2024 2025 2026

III. What would happen if China invaded Taiwan



TSMC shutdown:

Production of 3-5 nm chips critical to Nvidia would halt or be severely constrained, triggering an immediate semiconductor shortage

Market panic and sanctions:

Global markets would nosedive; the U.S. and allies would impose export controls while China retaliates, crushing tech valuations, including Nvidia's

Global economic shock:

A blockade of the Taiwan Strait and logistic disruptions would fuel cost inflation and slash demand for PCs, data centers, and vehicles, sharply cutting GPU orders and deepening the tech downturn

Trade War: Direct Impact on Nvidia

How the tariff war between USA and China can affect Nvidia?




Donald Trump at "libertation day"

On 2 April 2025 President Trump signed Executive Order imposing a blanket 10 % tariff on almost all U.S. imports from 184 countries starting 5 April, while creating country-by-country "reciprocal" rates, many well above the baseline, to begin on 9 April

Pressure China to curb unfair practices, IP theft, subsidies, and forced tech transfers Shield strategic U.S. industries such as steel, semiconductors, and clean energy under the banner of national security

Gain negotiating leverage, spotlighting America's large trade deficit with China


How this can affect Nvidia?



Nvidia ships its finished chips, made in Taiwan and supplemented by China-sourced components, to **Foxconn plants in Mexico**, where PCB, memory, and firmware are integrated; this "substantial transformation" meets **USMCA rules of origin**, allowing the systems to **enter the United States tariff-free**

US tariff on China soars to 84 %, versus ~25 % on other partners





Anyway... NVDIA has pricing power

Case Study about 2018's tariffs

In 2018, a **25** % **tariff on China-made GPUs** raised Nvidia's costs. Nevertheless, it lifted card prices by about 10–15 %, **kept demand strong**, and closed the fiscal year with a gross margin above 60 %, underscoring its **robust pricing power**

Jensen Huang, Nvidia's Founder & CEO

"The impact of tariffs won't be meaningful"




DCF

Why not DCF?


Why we believe it doesn't make sense to value Nvidia using a DCF

We had a call with some analysts, and a part of them said that running a DCF for Nvidia is just a theoretical exercise




João Pedro Freitas - Mainú Capital

"With so much volatility and limited visibility into Nvidia's future revenue streams, a DCF becomes more of a storytelling tool than a dependable valuation method. You're basically modeling uncertainty on top of uncertainty"



Guilherme Amaral - Kinea

"At Kinea, we don't use DCF for tech. It just doesn't make sense given the volatility and low visibility on long-term fundamentals. Multiples give us a cleaner read on what's priced in"



Gabriel Oliveira - Verde Asset

"At Verde, we do run DCFs, but mostly to understand value boundaries and test assumptions. In the end, what really drives allocation is knowing what's priced in today, and that comes much more from multiples and the narrative behind them"



Itaú Report about Nvidia

"We initiate with an outperform rating, as we believe we are in the early innings of a strong cycle. Although US investors typically don't use a DCF, we decided to go for it to value the company as we consider a long road for growth. Our TP is of USD 500"

So, why we prefer use multiples...

The perpetuity fails to reflect the company's real long-term growth potential, especially in fast-evolving sectors like semiconductors

Small changes in key assumptions can drastically alter the valuation, making the model unstable

The terminal value dominates the output, often accounting for the majority of the DCF, which reduces its reliability

In our model **70.5%** of Fair Value is **on perpetuity**



FCFF Valuation

Our DCF valuation for FCFF

| \$mn Cui | rrent 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | Perpetuidade |
|--|--|-------------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|
| Period | 0,75 | 1,75 | 2,75 | 3,75 | 4,75 | 5,75 | 6,75 | 7,75 | 8,75 | 9,75 | |
| Valuation FCFF | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EBIT | 139.199 | 167.395 | 189.831 | 212.299 | 243.656 | 280.726 | 323.311 | 372.225 | 428.406 | 481.382 | |
| (+) D&A | 2.240 | 2.180 | 2.284 | 2.391 | 2.622 | 2.964 | 3.367 | 3.838 | 4.384 | 5.015 | |
| (-) Taxes | (23.194) | (27.856) | (31.641) | (35.480) | (40.810) | (47.076) | (54.276) | (62.546) | (72.046) | (81.052) | |
| (+/-) Delta Working Capital | (6.841) | (6.822) | (5.428) | (5.436) | (7.586) | (8.707) | (9.993) | (11.469) | (13.163) | (7.125) | |
| (-) Capex | (2.775) | (3.337) | (3.784) | (4.232) | (4.857) | (5.574) | (6.398) | (7.343) | (8.427) | (9.672) | |
| FCFF | 108.629 | 131.560 | 151.263 | 169.542 | 193.025 | 222.333 | 256.012 | 294.706 | 339.154 | 398.221 | 7.707.598 |
| Present Value FCFF | 100.843 | 110.600 | 115.159 | 116.890 | 120.516 | 125.709 | 131.086 | 136.653 | 142.416 | 151.433 | 3.077.541 |
| Enterprise Value 4.328.847 Net Debt (34.747) | Actual Price | 140 | (pilitie | Perp Growth | 5,0% | | | | | | |
| Fair Value FCFF 4.363.594 | Shares Outstanding | 24.400 | J. | WACC | 10,4% | | | | | | |
| Fair Price FCFF 179 | , and the second se | | * | ************ | | | | | | | |
| - The state of the | Current Market Cap | 3.415.756,0 | | | | | | | | | |
| Upside FCFF 27,7% | | | | | | | | | | | |
| The state of the s | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *************************************** | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | 1 | | | Growth | | | |
|----|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Upside | 3,5% | 4,0% | 4,5% | 5% | 5,5% | 6,0% | 6,5% |
| | 8,9% | 40,6% | 51,8% | 65,6% | 82,9% | 105,2% | 135,2% | 177,5% |
| U | 9,4% | 27,2% | 36,2% | 47,0% | 60,3% | 77,0% | 98,5% | 127,4% |
| | 9,9% | 15,9% | 23,2% | 31,9% | 42,3% | 55,2% | 71,3% | 92,1% |
| βÇ | 10,4% | 6,2% | 12,3% | 19,4% | 27,7% | 37,8% | 50,2% | 65,8% |
| ≥ | 10,9% | -2,1% | 3,0% | 8,8% | 15,7% | 23,8% | 33,5% | 45,5% |
| | 11,4% | -9,3% | -5,0% | -0,1% | 5,5% | 12,1% | 20,0% | 29,4% |
| | 11,9% | -15,6% | -11,9% | -7,8% | -3,1% | 2,4% | 8,7% | 16,3% |

| | | | | Gr | ross Margin | | | |
|------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|
| _ | Upside | 60,0% | 65,0% | 70,0% | 75,0% | 80,0% | 85,0% | 90,0% |
| | 7,5% | 7,5% | 19,0% | 30,5% | 41,9% | 53,4% | 64,9% | 76,4% |
| | 10,5% | 3,9% | 15,0% | 26,1% | 37,2% | 48,3% | 59,4% | 70,5% |
| Rate | 13,5% | 0,3% | 11,0% | 21,7% | 32,5% | 43,2% | 53,9% | 64,7% |
| | 16,5% | -3,3% | 7,0% | 17,4% | 27,7% | 38,1% | 48,4% | 58,8% |
| Тах | 19,5% | -6,9% | 3,1% | 13,1% | 23,0% | 33,0% | 43,0% | 53,0% |
| | 22,5% | -10,5% | -0,9% | 8,7% | 18,3% | 27,9% | 37,5% | 47,1% |
| | 25,5% | -14,0% | -4,8% | 4,4% | 13,6% | 22,8% | 32,1% | 41,3% |



FCFE Valuation

Our DCF valuation for FCFE

| \$mn | Current 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | Perpetuidade |
|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Valuation FCFE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FCFF | 108.629 | 131.560 | 151.263 | 169.542 | 193.025 | 222.333 | 256.012 | 294.706 | 339.154 | 398.221 | 7.707.598 |
| (+/) A Dobt | _ | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | | _ | _ | |
| (+/-) Δ Debt (-) Interest | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | - (489) |
| FCFE | 108.140 | 131.071 | 150.774 | 169.053 | 192.536 | 221.844 | 255.523 | 294.217 | 338.665 | 397.732 | 7.707.109 |
| Present Value FCFE | 100.379 | 110.165 | 114.747 | 116.497 | 120.139 | 125.342 | 130.725 | 136.293 | 142.055 | 151.061 | 2.927.218 |
| | | | 114.747 | 110.437 | 120.133 | 123.342 | 130.723 | 130.233 | 142.033 | 131.001 | 2.327.210 |
| Fair Value FCFE 4.174.623 Fair Price FCFE 171 | Ke | 10,4% | | | | | | | | | |
| Upside FCFE 22,22% |) | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <i>''</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | Growth | | | |
|-----|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | Upside | 3,5% | 4,0% | 4,5% | 5,0% | 5,5% | 6,0% | 6,5% |
| | 8,9% | 15,1% | 21,3% | 28,7% | 37,4% | 47,8% | 60,6% | 76,7% |
| | 9,4% | 10,7% | 16,8% | 23,8% | 32,1% | 42,1% | 54,3% | 69,7% |
| | 9,9% | 6,6% | 12,4% | 19,1% | 27,0% | 36,6% | 48,3% | 63,0% |
| ACC | 10,4% | 2,7% | 8,2% | 14,6% | 22,2% | 31,4% | 42,6% | 56,7% |
| ≶ | 10,9% | -1,1% | 4,2% | 10,3% | 17,6% | 26,4% | 37,1% | 50,6% |
| | 11,4% | -4,7% | 0,4% | 6,3% | 13,2% | 21,6% | 31,9% | 44,8% |
| | 11,9% | -8,1% | -3,3% | 2,4% | 9,0% | 17,1% | 26,9% | 39,2% |

| | | | | (| Gross Margin | | | |
|------|--------|--------|-------------------|-------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | Upside | 60,0% | 65,0% | 70,0% | 75,0% | 80,0% | 85,0% | 90,0% |
| | 7,5% | 2,7% | % 13,7% 24,8% 35, | | 35,9% | 47,0% | 58,1% | 69,2% |
| Rate | 10,5% | -0,8% | 9,9% | 20,6% | 31,3% | 42,1% | 52,8% | 63,5% |
| | 13,5% | -4,3% | 6,1% | 16,4% | 26,8% | 37,1% | 47,5% | 57,8% |
| | 16,5% | -7,8% | 2,2% | 12,2% | 22,2% | 32,2% | 42,2% | 52,2% |
| Tax | 19,5% | -11,2% | -1,6% | 8,0% | 17,7% | 27,3% | 36,9% | 46,6% |
| | 22,5% | -14,7% | -5,4% | 3,9% | 13,1% | 22,4% | 31,7% | 40,9% |
| | 25,5% | -18,1% | -9,2% | -0,3% | 8,6% | 17,5% | 26,4% | 35,3% |



DCF Scenarios

| | Bear | Base | Bull |
|------------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|
| Marginal CapEx to Data Center (%) | 70.0% | 80.0% | 90.0% |
| CapEx destined to Accelerators (%) | 50.0% | 60.0% | 70.0% |
| NVIDIA GPU Market Share (%) | 70.0% | 80.0% | 90.0% |
| Gross Margin | 65% | 75% | 80% |
| Upside | (19.2%) | 27.7% | 72.8% |



WACC

How we calculate our WACC



Perpetuity Growth

The reasons behind the growth rate we used in perpetuity

Perpetuity growth of 5.0% fits between risk-free rate and nominal growth

Aswath Insight




| | free Rate = Expe | | | Nominal GDP Gr | owth = Expected Inflation | | | |
|-----|--|------------------|-------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--|--|
| agr | real interest rate se to return to le ds/services. | | | The real growth rate in the econ- measures the expected growth i production of goods and service | | | | |
| The | argument for R | isk free rate = | Nominal GDP | growth | | | | |
| 1. | In the long tern | n, the real grow | th rate cannot be | lower than the ro | | | | |
| 2. | In the long term | , the real grow | th rate can be hi | gher than the real | interest rate, to | | | |
| | | | | es mature, the diff ties in the econom | erence should get | | | |
| | assume that the | | | | iy, it is prugent to | | | |


"One simple proxy for the nominal growth rate of the economy is the risk-free rate"



NVIDIA has shown steady growth, and we believe this will continue



2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025






Senna x Consensus

Where we Disagree with the Consensus?

We diverge from consensus on gross margin, projecting 75% versus the consensus at 70%

The ecosystem is ruthless in locking in clients through switching costs and scale



III. Besides having pricing due to its ecosystem, it locks in clients through its contracts

Multi-generation contracts

∞Meta

Google








Clients must commit to purchasing future, unreleased GPU generations in order to access the current ones — agreeing to buy up to 3x the volume


II. Rare pricing power lets the company raise prices without pushback



" In software markets, switching costs are often particularly high due to incompatibility of data formats, user retraining, and the need to rewrite custom code. These costs can deter customers from switching even if alternative products are available and better. In markets with high switching costs, a monopolist can continue to charge high prices or maintain market dominance long after the competitive advantage that initially attracted customers has eroded "

Majourdat for of Inhange man and the Control of Contro

IV. Higher Data Center share has driven NVIDIA's Gross Margin expansion






Supply Analysis

| Supply Analysis | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
|------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | | | |
| Wafers TSMC | 120.000 | 156.000 | 184.000 | 210.000 |
| Yield (%) | 80% | 80% | 80% | 80% |
| NVDA (%) | 70% | 70% | 70% | 70% |
| Wafers to NVIDIA | 67.200 | 87.360 | 103.040 | 117.600 |
| Others Production | 30.000 | 30.000 | 30.000 | 30.000 |
| Yield (%) | 60% | 60% | 60% | 60% |
| NVDA (%) | 55% | 55% | 55% | 55% |
| Wafers to NVIDIA | 9.900 | 9.900 | 9.900 | 9.900 |
| NVDA Total Wafers | 77.100 | 97.260 | 112.940 | 127.500 |
| Blackwell Wafers | 52.428 | 68.082 | 90.352 | 121.125 |
| % of Wafers to NVIDIA | 68% | 70% | 80% | 95% |
| Hopper Wafers | 24.672 | 29.178 | 22.588 | 6.375 |
| % of Wafers to NVIDIA | 32% | 30% | 20% | 5% |
| Blackwell Restriction | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Hopper Restriction | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
| NVIDIA Implied GPUs | 1.606.764 | 2.003.556 | 2.191.036 | 2.244.000 |
| Blackwell | 891.276 | 1.157.394 | 1.535.984 | 2.059.125 |
| Hopper | 715.488 | 846.162 | 655.052 | 184.875 |
| ASP Blackwell | 31.000 | 31.000 | 31.000 | 31.000 |
| ASP Hopper | 20.000 | 18.000 | 15.000 | 15.000 |
| Data Center Computing Revenue | 41.939.316.000 | 51.110.130.000 | 57.441.284.000 | 66.606.000.000 |
| | | 217.096.730.00 | | |
| NVDA Data Center Computing Revenue | | 0 | | |




Gross Margin







EBIT Margin







Net Margin








Sequoia Paper

Is AI a bubble?

I. The Sequoia paper questions if AI infrastructure investments are growing faster than revenue can justify



II. With our cost assumptions, the AI revenue required for payback drops significantly, suggesting the gap may be smaller than initially projected

| ı | Q4 2023 ESTIMATE | Q4 2023 ACTUAL | Q12024 ACTUAL | Q4 2024 ESTIMATE |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| NVDA Data Center Run-Rate Revenue | \$50 | \$74 | \$90 | \$150 |
| Data Center Facility Build and Cost to Operate | 50% | 50% | 50% | 50% |
| Implied Data Center AI Spend | \$100 | \$147 | \$181 | \$300 |
| Software Margin | 50% | 50% | 50% | 50% |
| Al Revenue Required for Payback | \$200 | \$294 | \$363 | \$600 |

Expected NVIDIA Revenue ÷ Data Center Costs = Implied AI Ramp Speed
Implied AI Ramp Speed ÷ Software Margin = AI Required Revenue for Payback

| Q4 2023 | Q1 2024 | Q4 2024 |
|---------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Actual | Actual | Estimate |
| 74 | 90 | 150 |
| 60% | 60% | 60% |
| 123 | 150 | 250 |
| 75% | 75% | 75% |
| 164 | 200 | 333 |
| | Actual 74 60% 123 75% | Actual Actual 74 90 60% 60% 123 150 75% 75% |

Data Center Facility Build and Cost to Operate: Using 60% better reflects current data center efficiency, with lower marginal costs, scale gains, and infrastructure reuse, making the assumption more realistic

Software Margin: A 75% software margin is justified by low marginal costs, premium pricing, and strong lock-in from proprietary ecosystems like CUDA



Model


NVDIA's Revenue

| Nvidia's Data Center Revenue | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Data Center Revenue | 2.983 | 6.696 | 10.613 | 15.005 | 47.525 | 115.186 | 202.269 | 243.501 | 276.262 | 307.217 | 351.234 |
| YoY (%) | | 124% | 58% | 41% | 217% | 142% | 76% | 20% | 13% | 11% | 14% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Compute | 2.983 | 5.065 | 7.793 | 11.317 | 38.950 | 102.196 | 179.459 | 216.040 | 245.107 | 272.571 | 311.624 |
| YoY (%) | | 70% | 54% | 45% | 244% | 162% | 76% | 20% | 13% | 11% | 14% |
| % of Data Center Revenue | 100% | 76% | 73% | 75% | 82% | 89% | 89% | 89% | 89% | 89% | 89% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Networking | - | 1.631 | 2.820 | 3.688 | 8.575 | 12.990 | 22.811 | 27.461 | 31.155 | 34.646 | 39.610 |
| YoY (%) | | | 73% | 31% | 133% | 51% | - | - | - | - | |
| % of Compute Revenue | | 24% | 27% | 25% | 18% | 11% | 11% | _ | - | - | - |
| | | | | | | | | - | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nvidia's Gaming Revenue | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gaming Revenue | 5.518 | 7.759 | 12.462 | 9.067 | 10.447 | 11.350 | 13.717 | 16.021 | 17.241 | 19.785 | 22.705 |
| YoY (%) | | 41% | 61% | -27% | 15% | 9% | 21% | 17% | 8% | 15% | 15% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PC Gaming | 5.293 | 7.573 | 12.462 | 8.854 | 10.181 | 10.951 | 13.168 | 15.233 | 16.133 | 18.210 | 20.478 |
| YoY (%) | | 43% | 65% | -29% | 15% | 8% | 20% | 16% | 6% | 13% | 12% |
| % of Gaming Revenue | 96% | 98% | 100% | 98% | 97% | 96% | 96% | 95% | 94% | 92% | 90% |
| 7y,g | | | | | | | 20% | 16% | 6% | 13% | 12% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Console Gaming (Tegra) | 225 | 186 | - | 213 | 266 | 399 | 548 | 788 | 1.108 | 1.575 | 2.227 |
| YoY (%) | | -17% | -100% | _ | 25% | 50% | 37% | 44% | 41% | 42% | 41% |
| % of Gaming Revenue | 4% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 6% | 8% | 10% |
| 7y,g | | | | | | | 37% | 44% | 41% | 42% | 41% |
| | | | | | | | 37 70 | 1172 | 1270 | 1270 | 1270 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nvidia's Others Revenues | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Professional Visualization | 1.212 | 1.053 | 2.111 | 1.544 | 1.553 | 1.878 | 1.972 | 2.090 | 2.237 | 2.415 | 2.633 |
| YoY (%) | | -13% | 100% | -27% | 1% | 21% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 9% |
| (1-1) | | | | | | | 5% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 9% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Automotive | 700 | 536 | 566 | 903 | 1.091 | 1.694 | 2.460 | 3.523 | 4.975 | 6.925 | 9.502 |
| YOY (%) | | -23% | 6% | 60% | 21% | 55% | 45% | 43% | 41% | 39% | 37% |
| 11-7 | | 20/0 | 0,0 | 00/0 | 22/0 | 5575 | 45% | 43% | 41% | 39% | 37% |
| | | | | | | | .5/5 | .5/5 | .2/5 | 33,0 | 3. ,0 |
| OEM | 505 | 631 | 1.162 | 455 | 306 | 389 | 401 | 413 | 425 | 438 | 451 |
| YOY (%) | 303 | 25% | 84% | -61% | -33% | 27% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| 101 (70) | | 23/0 | O470 | -01/0 | -3370 | 27/0 | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| | | | | | | | 3% | 370 | 3% | 370 | 3 70 |




NVIDIA Total Revenue

NVIDIA's Total Revenue (US\$ Billion) 2010-2024




NVIDIA Data Center Revenue


NVIDIA's Total Revenue (US\$ Billion) 2010-2024




NVIDIA Projected Total Revenue NVIDIA's Total Revenue (US\$ Billion) 2025E-2029E




NVIDIA Projected Data Center Revenue NVIDIA's Total Revenue (US\$ Billion) 2025E-2029E



NVIDIA's Revenue per segment (%) NVIDIA's Total Revenue (US\$ Billion) 2025E-2029E




NVIDIA's Revenue per segment (US\$)





NVIDIA Projected Margins NVIDIA's Margins 2025E-2029E





2021 2022 2023 2024 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E

Projected ROIC





2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E

Sensitivity AnalysisWe performed a sensitivity analysis to assess how changes in inputs would affect the project's IRR

| | | Exit Multiple | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | IRR | 25x | 26x | 27x | 28x | 29x | 30x | 31x | | | | | | |
| | 2026 | 24,1% | 28,9% | 33,7% | 38,5% | 43,4% | 48,2% | 53,0% | | | | | | |
| Exit Year | 2027 | 19,8% | 22,0% | 24,3% | 26,4% | 28,6% | 30,7% | 32,8% | | | | | | |
| Exit | 2028 | 19,3% | 20,8% | 22,2% | 23,2% | 25,0% | 26,4% | 27,7% | | | | | | |
| | 2029 | 19,2% | 21,3% | 22,3% | 22,3% | 23,4% | 24,3% | 25,3% | | | | | | |



Revenue Build Up (TAM)

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|---|-------|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| TAM Comparatives | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dell'oro (Jensen) Global Data Center Capex | | | | 220.000 | 260.000 | 460.000 | 556.600 | 673.486 | 814.918 | 986.051 | 1.193.122 |
| YoY (%) | | | | | 18% | 77% | 21% |] | | | |
| Nvidia's Data Center Revenue | 2.983 | 6.696 | 10.613 | 15.005 | 47.525 | 115.186 | 244.904 | 304.079 | 376.492 | 464.923 | 572.698 |
| % of Global Capex | | | | 7% | 18% | 25% | 44% | 45% | 46% | 47% | 48% |
| % of Data Center Capex for GPUs | | | | | | | 50% | 53% | 55% | 58% | 60% |
| % of NVIDIA GPU Market Share | | | | | | | 88% | 86% | 84% | 82% | 80% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| McKinsey | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Data Ceter CAPEX driven by AI | | | | | | | 556.600 | 656.788 | 775.010 | 914.512 | 1.079.124 |
| % IT equipment (CPUs, GPUs, memory) | | | | | | | 60% | | | | |
| % of IT equipment for GPUs | | | | | | | 60% | | | | |
| % of IT equipment for CPUs | | | | | | | 10% | | | | |
| % of NVIDIA Market Share | | | | | | | 88% | 86% | 84% | 82% | 80% |
| CAGR Capex | | | | | | | 18% | | | | |
| Nvidia's Data Center Revenue | | | | | | | 205.719 | 237.232 | 273.423 | 314.958 | 362.586 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AMD (Lisa Su) Total Accelerators Market Revenue | 2.983 | 5.065 | 11.487 | 17.360 | 45.446 | 127.528 | 179.451 | 252.515 | 355.327 | 500.000 | 703.576 |
| NVIDIA | 2.983 | 5.065 | 7.793 | 11.317 | 38.950 | 102.196 | | | | | |
| AMD | - | - | 3.694 | 6.043 | 6.496 | 12.579 | _ | | | | |
| Market Share Assumption (%) | | | | | | 90% | | | | | _ |
| Implied CAGR (%) | | | | | | | 41% | 41% | 41% | 41% | 41% |
| NVIDIA Accelerators Revenue | | | | | | | 157.917 | 217.163 | 298.475 | 410.000 | 562.861 |
| Market Share (%) | | | | | | 88% | 88% | 86% | 84% | 82% | 80% |



Revenue Build Up (Hyperscale CapEx)

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E | |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|---------|------------------------------|---------|------------------|---------|--|
| lyperscalers Capex | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Microsoft | | | | | | 22.239 | 37.829 | 44.039 | 50.698 | 56.221 | 62.379 | |
| YOY (%) | | | | | | 22.239 | 37.029 | 44.039 | 30.096 | 30.221 | 02.379 | |
| Capex | 13.925 | 15.441 | 20.622 | 23.886 | 28.107 | 44.477 | 65.265 | 72.607 | 80.052 | 86.955 | 94.652 | |
| | 15.925 | 15.441 | 20.022 | 23.000 | 20.107 | 44.477 | 15.591 | 21.801 | 28.460 | 33.983 | 40.140 | |
| (Δ) Capex for AI | | ··· | 4 | | 4 | <u> </u> | 58% | 61% | 63% | 55.985 65% | 66% | |
| Managia at Caraci | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 20.788 | 28.130 | 35.575 | 42.478 | 50.175 | |
| Amazon | | | | | | 41.500 | 57.367 | 61.416 | 64.569 | 66.579 | 70.022 | |
| YoY (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Capex | 16.861 | 40.140 | 61.053 | 63.645 | 52.729 | 82.999 | 104.155 | 108.698 | 111.836 | 114.348 | 118.652 | |
| (Δ) Capex for AI | | | | | | | 15.867 | 19.916 | 23.070 | 25.079 | 28.522 | |
| , , , | | | | | | | 55% | 57% | 58% | 58% | 59% | |
| Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 21.156 | 25.699 | 28.837 | 31.349 | 35.653 | |
| - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oracle | | | | | | 3.433 | 17.012 | 19.237 | 20.263 | 21.627 | 26.029 | |
| YoY (%) | | | | | | | i | | | | | |
| Capex | 1.660 | 1.564 | 2.135 | 4.511 | 8.695 | 6.866 | 24.971 | 27.258 | 27.903 | 29.608 | 35.111 | |
| (Δ) Capex for AI | | | | | | | 13.579 | 15.804 | 16.830 | 18.194 | 22.596 | |
| () -) - | | | | | | | 68% | 71% | 73% | 73% | 74% | |
| Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 18.105 | 20.392 | 21.037 | 22.742 | 28.245 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Google | | | | | | 26.268 | 41.842 | 45.535 | 49.379 | 52.280 | 54.456 | |
| YoY (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Capex | 23.548 | 22.281 | 24.640 | 31.485 | 32.251 | 52.535 | 73.301 | 77.396 | 81.424 | 85.051 | 87.771 | |
| (Δ) Capex for AI | | | | | | | 15.574 | 19.268 | 23.111 | 26.012 | 28.188 | |
| | | | | | | | 57% | 59% | 61% | 61% | 62% | |
| Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 20.766 | 24.861 | 28.889 | 32.516 | 35.236 | |
| Meta | | | | | | 18.628 | 40.634 | 50.084 | 50.392 | 49.915 | 53.102 | |
| YoY (%) | | | | | | 10.020 | 40.034 | 30.004 | 30.332 | 43.313 | 33.102 | |
| Capex | 15.102 | 15.163 | 18.690 | 31.431 | 27.266 | 37.256 | 66.598 | 77.844 | 76.961 | 76.364 | 80.348 | |
| · | 15.102 | 15.105 | 10.030 | 31.431 | 27.200 | 37.230 | 22.006 | 77.8 44 31.456 | 31.764 | 76.364 31.287 | 34.474 | |
| (Δ) Capex for AI | | | | | | | 61% | 31.456 64% | | 65% | | |
| Marainal Canox | | | | | | | | | 65% | | 66% | |
| Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 29.342 | 40.588 | 39.705 | 39.108 | 43.092 | |

Bloomberg



Revenue Build Up (Premisses to Data Center)

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % of Capex Destined for Data Center in Actual Capex | | | | | | 50% | | | | | |
| % of Capex Destined for Data Center in Marginal Capex | | | | | | | 75% | 78% | 80% | 80% | 80% |
| Accelerators Capex | | | | | | 56.033 | 97.342 | 115.663 | 129.416 | 141.807 | 159.592 |
| % of Hyperscalers Technology Capex | | | | | | 50% | 50% | 53% | 55% | 58% | 60% |
| ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Capex of Hyperscalers to NVIDIA Revenue | | | | | | 49.309 | 85.661 | 99.470 | 108.709 | 116.282 | 127.674 |
| % of NVIDIA Market Share | | | | | | 88% | 88% | 86% | 84% | 82% | 80% |
| Top 5 Hyperscalers as 42.35% | | | | | | 116.433 | 202.269 | 243.501 | 276.262 | 307.217 | 351.234 |
| Hyperscalers Share of NVIDIA Revenue (%) | -1% | | | | | 42% | 42% | 41% | 39% | 38% | 36% |
| Astronomy Control Programme | | | | | | 445.406 | İ | | | | |
| Actual Data Center Revenue | | | | | | 115.186 | | | | | |
| NVIDIA Data Center Revenue | | | | | | | 202.269 | 243.501 | 276.262 | 307.217 | 351.234 |

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Nvidia's Data Center Revenue | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Data Center Revenue | 2.983 | 6.696 | 10.613 | 15.005 | 47.525 | 115.186 | 202.269 | 243.501 | 276.262 | 307.217 | 351.234 |
| YoY (%) | | 124% | 58% | 41% | 217% | 142% | 76% | 20% | 13% | 11% | 14% |
| Compute | 2.983 | 5.065 | 7.793 | 11.317 | 38.950 | 102.196 | 179.459 | 216.040 | 245.107 | 272.571 | 311.624 |
| YoY (%) % of Data Center Revenue | 100% | 70% 76% | 54% 73% | 45% 75% | 244% 82% | 162% 89% | 76% 89% | 20% 89% | 13% 89% | 11% 89% | 14% 89% |
| Networking | - | 1.631 | 2.820 | 3.688 | 8.575 | 12.990 | 22.811 | 27.461 | 31.155 | 34.646 | 39.610 |
| YoY (%) % of Compute Revenue | | 24% | 73% 27% | 31% 25% | 133% 18% | 51% 11% | 11% | -] - | - | - | - |



Revenue Build Up (Others)

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|----------------------------|-------|----------------|------------------|------------|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Nvidia's Gaming Revenue | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gaming Revenue | 5.518 | 7.759 | 12.462 | 9.067 | 10.447 | 11.350 | 13.717 | 16.021 | 17.241 | 19.785 | 22.705 |
| YoY (%) | | 41% | 61% | -27% | 15% | 9% | 21% | 17% | 8% | 15% | 15% |
| PC Gaming | 5.293 | 7.573 | 12.462 | 8.854 | 10.181 | 10.951 | 13.168 | 15.233 | 16.133 | 18.210 | 20.478 |
| YoY (%) | | 43% | 65% | -29% | 15% | 8% | 20% | 16% | 6% | 13% | 12% |
| % of Gaming Revenue | 96% | 98% | 100% | 98% | 97% | 96% | 96% | 95% | 94% | 92% | 90% |
| | | | | | | | 20% | 16% | 6% | 13% | 12% |
| Console Gaming (Tegra) | 225 | 186 | - | 213 | 266 | 399 | 548 | 788 | 1.108 | 1.575 | 2.227 |
| YoY (%) | | -17% | -100% | - | 25% | 50% | 37% | 44% | 41% | 42% | 41% |
| % of Gaming Revenue | 4% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 6% | 8% | 10% |
| | | | | | | | 37% | 44% | 41% | 42% | 41% |
| Nvidia's Others Revenues | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Professional Visualization | 1.212 | 1.053 | 2.111 | 1.544 | 1.553 | 1.878 | 1.972 | 2.090 | 2.237 | 2.415 | 2.633 |
| YoY (%) | | -13% | 100% | -27% | 1% | 21% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 9% |
| | | | | | | | 5% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 9% |
| Automotive | 700 | 536 | 566 | 903 | 1.091 | 1.694 | 2.460 | 3.523 | 4.975 | 6.925 | 9.502 |
| YoY (%) | | -23% | 6% | 60% | 21% | 55% | 45% | 43% | 41% | 39% | 37% |
| • • | | | | | | | 45% | 43% | 41% | 39% | 37% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OEM | 505 | 631 | 1.162 | 455 | 306 | 389 | 401 | 413 | 425 | 438 | 451 |
| OEM YoY (%) | 505 | 631 25% | 1.162 84% | 455 | 306 | 389 27% | 401 3% | 413 3% | 425 3% | 438 3% | 451 3% |



Income Statement Model

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|--|--------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------------------------|
| Income Statement | | | | | | | | | | | _ |
| income statement | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenue | 10.918 | 16.675 | 26.914 | 26.974 | 60.922 | 130.497 | 220.818 | 265.548 | 301.139 | 336.781 | 386.525 |
| YoY (%) | | 53% | 61% | 0% | 126% | 114% | 69% | 20% | 13% | 12% | 15% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cost of revenue | (4.150) | (6.279) | (9.439) | (11.618) | (16.621) | (32.639) | (55.121) | (66.287) | (75.171) | (84.068) | (96.485) |
| Gross profit | 6.768 | 10.396 | 17.475 | 15.356 | 44.301 | 97.858 | 165.697 | 199.261 | 225.968 | 252.713 | 290.039 |
| Gross Margin | 62% | 62% | 65% | 57% | 73% | 75% | 75,0% | 75,0% | 75,0% | 75,0% | 75,0% |
| or out manyin | 02/0 | 0270 | 0370 | 3770 | 7370 | 7370 | 7 3,0 /0 | 13,070 | 13,070 | 73,070 | 7 3,070 |
| Amortized Intangible Assets | 26 | 612 | 563 | 699 | 614 | 563 | 555 | 354 | 236 | 84 | 31 |
| PP&E Amortizaion | 355 | 486 | 611 | 844 | 894 | 892 | 1.685 | 1.826 | 2.048 | 2.307 | 2.591 |
| · | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total D&A | 381 | 1.098 | 1.174 | 1.543 | 1.508 | 1.455 | 2.240 | 2.180 | 2.284 | 2.391 | 2.622 |
| EBITDA | 3.227 | 5.630 | 11.215 | 5.767 | 34.480 | 82.908 | 141.439 | 169.575 | 192.115 | 214.689 | 246.278 |
| EBITDA Margin | 30% | 34% | 42% | 21% | 57% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operating expenses | (3.922) | (5.864) | (7.434) | (11.132) | (11.329) | (16.405) | (26.498) | (31.866) | (36.137) | (40.414) | (46.383) |
| Decearch and development | 2 820 | 2.024 | F 269 | 7 220 | 9.675 | 12.014 | 20.079 | 25.227 | 38 608 | 31.004 | 26 720 |
| Research and development As a % of Revenue | 2.829 26% | 3.924 24% | 5.268 20% | 7.339 27% | 8.675 14% | 12.914 10% | 20.978 10% | 25.227 | 28.608 | 31.994 | 36.720 |
| Sales, general and administrative | 1.093 | 1.940 | 2.166 | 2.440 | 2.654 | 3.491 | 5.520 | 6.639 | 7.528 | 8.420 | 9.663 |
| As a % of Revenue | 10% | 12% | 8% | 9% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 0.033 | 7.520 | 0.720 | 5.005 |
| Acquisition termination cost | - | _ | - | 1.353 | - | - | - | - - | - | - | - |
| As a % of Revenue | 0% | 0% | 0% | 5% | 0% | 0% | 0% | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operating income | 2.846 | 4.532 | 10.041 | 4.224 | 32.972 | 81.453 | 139.199 | 167.395 | 189.831 | 212.299 | 243.656 |
| EBIT Margin | 26% | 27% | 37% | 16% | 54% | 62% | 63% | 63% | 63% | 63% | 63% |
| Interest income | 178 | 57 | 29 | 267 | 866 | 1.786 | 1.862 | 1.921 | 2.419 | 3.220 | 4.166 |
| Interest expense | (52) | (184) | (236) | (262) | (257) | (247) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) | (489) |
| Other, net | (2) | 4 | 107 | (48) | 237 | 1.034 | (483) | (483) | (483) | (483) | (4 0 <i>3)</i> |
| , | (-/ | • | 20. | () | 20, | 2.00 | | | | | |
| Income before income tax | 2.970 | 4.409 | 9.941 | 4.181 | 33.818 | 84.026 | 140.572 | 168.827 | 191.761 | 215.030 | 247.333 |
| EBT Margin | 27% | 26% | 37% | 16% | 56% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% | 64% |
| Income toy eyenne | (174) | (77) | (100) | 107 | (4.050) | (11 146) | (22.404) | (27.056) | (21 (41) | (25, 400) | (40.940) |
| Income tax expense | (174) <i>6%</i> | (77) 2% | (189) 2% | 187 <i>4%</i> | (4.058) 12% | (11.146) 13% | (23.194) 17% | (27.856) | (31.641) | (35.480) | (40.810) |
| Effective tax rate | 0% | Z70 | Z70 | 470 | 1270 | 1370 | 1/70 | | | | |
| Net income | 2.796 | 4.332 | 9.752 | 4.368 | 29.760 | 72.880 | 117.378 | 140.970 | 160.120 | 179.550 | 206.523 |
| Net Margin | 26% | 26% | 36% | 16% | 49% | 56% | 53% | 53% | 53% | 53% | 53% |
| YoY (%) | | 55% | 125% | -55% | 581% | 145% | 61% | 20% | 14% | 12% | 15% |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |



Balance Sheet Model

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|---|------------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------|---------|----------------|---------|----------------|----------------|----------|
| Balance Sheet | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Current assets | 13.690 | 16.055 | 28.829 | 23.073 | 44.345 | 80.126 | 105.437 | 131.507 | 158.390 | 187.762 | 223.093 |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 10.896 | 847 | 1.990 | 3.389 | 7.280 | 8.589 | 22.712 | 39.803 | 59.540 | 81.756 | 107.101 |
| Marketable securities | 1 | 10.714 | 19.218 | 9.907 | 18.704 | 34.621 | 34.621 | 34.621 | 34.621 | 34.621 | 34.621 |
| Accounts receivable, net | 1.657 | 2.429 | 4.650 | 3.827 | 9.999 | 23.065 | 31.329 | 37.675 | 42.725 | 47.782 | 54.839 |
| Inventories | 979 | 1.826 | 2.605 | 5.159 | 5.282 | 10.080 | 13.003 | 15.637 | 17.733 | 19.832 | 22.761 |
| Prepaid expenses and other current assets | 157 | 239 | 366 | 791 | 3.080 | 3.771 | 3.771 | 3.771 | 3.771 | 3.771 | 3.771 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-Current assets | 3.625 | 12.736 | 15.358 | 18.109 | 21.383 | 31.475 | 32.009 | 33.167 | 34.666 | 36.508 | 38.743 |
| Daniel and an impact ast | 1.674 | 2.149 | 2.778 | 3.807 | 3.914 | 6.283 | 6.806 | 7.636 | 8.599 | 9.660 | 10.934 |
| Property and equipment, net | 1.674 | 2.149 707 | 2.778 829 | 1.038 | 1.346 | 1.793 | | 1.793 | 8.599 1.793 | 9.660 1.793 | 10.934 |
| Operating lease assets Goodwill | 618 618 | 4.193 | 4.349 | 4.372 | 4.430 | 5.188 | 1.793 5.188 | 5.188 | 1.793 5.188 | 1.793 5.188 | 5.188 |
| Intangible assets, net | 49 | 2.737 | 2.339 | 1.676 | 1.112 | 807 | 819 | 1.146 | 1.683 | 2.463 | 3.423 |
| Deferred income tax assets | 548 | 806 | 1.222 | 3.396 | 6.081 | 10.979 | 10.979 | 10.979 | 10.979 | 10.979 | 10.979 |
| Other assets | 118 | 2.144 | 3.841 | 3.820 | 4.500 | 6.425 | 6.425 | 6.425 | 6.425 | 6.425 | 6.425 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total assets | 17.315 | 28.791 | 44.187 | 41.182 | 65.728 | 111.601 | 137.446 | 164.674 | 193.057 | 224.269 | 261.836 |
| Current liabilities: | 1.784 | 3.925 | 4.335 | 6.563 | 10.631 | 18.047 | 22.393 | 24.552 | 26.270 | 27.990 | 30.390 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Accounts payable | 687 | 1.149 | 1.783 | 1.193 | 2.699 | 6.310 | 10.656 | 12.815 | 14.533 | 16.253 | 18.653 |
| Accrued and other current liabilities | 1.097 | 1.777 | 2.552 | 4.120 | 6.682 | 11.737 | 11.737 | 11.737 | 11.737 | 11.737 | 11.737 |
| Short-term debt | - | 999 | - | 1.250 | 1.250 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Long-term liabilities | 3.327 | 7.973 | 13.240 | 12.518 | 12.119 | 14.227 | 14.227 | 14.227 | 14.227 | 14.227 | 14.227 |
| 2018 10111 102111100 | 0.027 | 7.070 | 20.2.10 | 22.020 | | | , | | | | |
| Long-term debt | 1.991 | 5.964 | 10.946 | 9.703 | 8.459 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 |
| Long-term operating lease liabilities | 561 | 634 | 741 | 902 | 1.119 | 1.519 | 1.519 | 1.519 | 1.519 | 1.519 | 1.519 |
| Other long-term liabilities | 775 | 1.375 | 1.553 | 1.913 | 2.541 | 4.245 | 4.245 | 4.245 | 4.245 | 4.245 | 4.245 |
| Total Liabilities | 5.111 | 11.898 | 17.575 | 19.081 | 22.750 | 32.274 | 36.620 | 38.779 | 40.497 | 42.217 | 44.617 |
| TOTAL FIRMINIES | 2.111 | 11.020 | 17.3/3 | 15.001 | 22./30 | 32.274 | 30.020 | 30.//3 | 40.437 | 42.21/ | 44.01/ |
| Total shareholders' equity | 12.204 | 16.893 | 26.612 | 22.101 | 42.978 | 79.327 | 100.826 | 125.895 | 152.560 | 182.053 | 217.219 |
| Preferred stock | | _ | _ | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ |
| Common stock | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 |
| Additional paid-in capital | 7.045 | 8.719 | 10.385 | 11.971 | 13.109 | 11.237 | 11.237 | 11.237 | 11.237 | 11.237 | 11.237 |
| Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) | 1 | 19 | (11) | (43) | 27 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| Treasury stock, at cost | (9.814) | (10.756) | - | - | - | | - | - | - | - | - |
| Retained earnings | 14.971 | 18.908 | 16.235 | 10.171 | 29.817 | 68.038 | 89.537 | 114.606 | 141.271 | 170.764 | 205.930 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total liabilities and shareholders' equity | 17.315 | 28.791 | 44.187 | 41.182 | 65.728 | 111.601 | 137.446 | 164.674 | 193.057 | 224.269 | 261.836 |
| BS Check | | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ |
| BS Check | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok | Ok |
| | | 0.0 | | | | | <u> </u> | | 0.1 | 0.1 | <u> </u> |



Cash Flow Model

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Cash Flow | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Income | | | | | | | 117.378 | 140.970 | 160.120 | 170 550 | 206 522 |
| Net Income | | | | | | | 117.578 | 140.970 | 160.120 | 179.550 | 206.523 |
| (+)D&A | | | | | | | 2.240 | 2.180 | 2.284 | 2.391 | 2.622 |
| (+/-)Δ Working Capital | | | | | | | (6.841) | (6.822) | (5.428) | (5.436) | (7.586) |
| CFO | | | | | | | 112.777 | 136.329 | 156.977 | 176.505 | 201.559 |
| (-) PP&E CapEx | | | | | | | (2.208) | (2.655) | (3.011) | (3.368) | (3.865) |
| (-) Acquired intangibles Capex | | | | | | | (567) | (681) | (773) | (864) | (992) |
| CFI | | | | | | | (2.775) | (3.337) | (3.784) | (4.232) | (4.857) |
| (-) Principal Amortization | | | | | | | _ | - | - | - | - |
| (-) SBC Buyback Compensation in Dividends | | | | | | | (15.846) | (19.056) | (21.610) | (24.168) | (27.737) |
| (-) Buyback Dividends | | | | | | | (80.033) | (96.845) | (111.845) | (125.890) | (143.620) |
| CFF | | | | | | | (95.879) | (115.901) | (133.455) | (150.057) | (171.358) |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cash BoP | | | | | | | 8.589 | 22.712 | 39.803 | 59.540 | 81.756 |
| Δ Cash | | | | | | | 14.123 | 17.090 | 19.737 | 22.216 | 25.345 |
| <u>a casii</u> | | | | | | | 14.125 | 17.050 | 15.757 | | |
| Cash EoP | | | | | | 8.589 | 22.712 | 39.803 | 59.540 | 81.756 | 107.101 |



Working Capital & Debt Model

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Working Capital | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Working Cupital | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Working Capital | 1.949 | 3.106 | 5.472 | 7.793 | 12.582 | 26.835 | 33.676 | 40.498 | 45.925 | 51.361 | 58.947 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Δ Working Capital | | 1.157 | 2.366 | 2.321 | 4.789 | 14.253 | 6.841 | 6.822 | 5.428 | 5.436 | 7.586 |
| Days | 365 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Working Capital - Assets | 2.636 | 4.255 | 7.255 | 8.986 | 15.281 | 33.145 | 44.332 | 53.313 | 60.458 | 67.614 | 77.600 |
| Accounts receivable | 1.657 | 2.429 | 4.650 | 3.827 | 9.999 | 23.065 | 31.329 | 37.675 | 42.725 | 47.782 | 54.839 |
| As a days of revenue | 55 | 53 | 63 | 52 | <u>9.999</u> 60 | 65 | 51.329 52 | 37.075 | 42.725 | 47.782 | 54.839 |
| As a days of revenue | 33 | 55 | 03 | 32 | 00 | 05 | 32 | | | | |
| Inventories | 979 | 1.826 | 2.605 | 5.159 | 5.282 | 10.080 | 13.003 | 15.637 | 17.733 | 19.832 | 22.761 |
| As a days of cost of revenue | 86 | 106 | 101 | 162 | 116 | 113 | 86 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Working Capital - Liabilities | 687 | 1.149 | 1.783 | 1.193 | 2.699 | 6.310 | 10.656 | 12.815 | 14.533 | 16.253 | 18.653 |
| working Capital - Liabilities | 007 | 1.143 | 1.705 | 1.155 | 2.055 | 0.510 | 10.030 | 12.015 | 14.555 | 10.255 | 10.055 |
| Accounts Payable | 687 | 1.149 | 1.783 | 1.193 | 2.699 | 6.310 | 10.656 | 12.815 | 14.533 | 16.253 | 18.653 |
| As a days of cost of revenue | 60 | 67 | 69 | 37 | 59 | 71 | 71 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Debt | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEDI | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Debt BOP | | | | | | - | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (+) New Debt | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - |
| (-) Amortization | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | |
| Total Debt EoP | | | | | | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 |
| Total Debt Lor | | | | | | 0.403 | 0.403 | 0.405 | 0.405 | 0.403 | 0.405 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

We chose to maintain the same debt level, assuming the company is operating with an optimal capital structure. In this sense, we won't amortize the debt, because even if it were paid down in reality, the company would likely issue new debt



PP&E & Acquired Intangibles Model

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| PP&E | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PP&E | 1.674 | 2.149 | 2.778 | 3.807 | 3.914 | 6.283 | 6.806 | 7.636 | 8.599 | 9.660 | 10.934 |
| ВоР | | 1.674 | 2.149 | 2.778 | 3.807 | 3.914 | 6.283 | 6.806 | 7.636 | 8.599 | 9.660 |
| (+) Capex | | 961 | 1.240 | 1.873 | 1.001 | 3.261 | 2.208 | 2.655 | 3.011 | 3.368 | 3.865 |
| As a % of revenue | | 6% | 5% | 7% | 2% | 2% | 1% | | | | |
| (-) Depreciation | | 486 | 611 | 844 | 894 | 892 | 1.685 | 1.826 | 2.048 | 2.307 | 2.591 |
| As a % of PP&E | | 29% | 28% | 30% | 23% | 23% | 27% | | | | |
| EoP | 1.674 | 2.149 | 2.778 | 3.807 | 3.914 | 6.283 | 6.806 | 7.636 | 8.599 | 9.660 | 10.934 |
| Acquired Intangibles | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Acquired Intangibles | 49 | 2.737 | 2.339 | 1.676 | 1.112 | 807 | 819 | 1.146 | 1.683 | 2.463 | 3.423 |
| ВоР | | 49 | 2.737 | 2.339 | 1.676 | 1.112 | 807 | 819 | 1.146 | 1.683 | 2.463 |
| (+) Purchases of Intangible Assets and Investments | | 3.300 | 165 | 36 | 50 | 258 | 567 | 681 | 773 | 864 | 992 |
| As a % of revenue | | 20% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0,26% | | | | |
| (-) Amortization of Intagible Assets | | 612 | 563 | 699 | 614 | 563 | 555 | 354 | 236 | 84 | 31 |
| As a % of PP&E | | 1249% | 21% | 30% | 37% | 51% | 69% | 43% | 21% | 5% | 1% |
| ЕоР | 49 | 2.737 | 2.339 | 1.676 | 1.112 | 807 | 819 | 1.146 | 1.683 | 2.463 | 3.423 |



Others Model

Interest income, Interest expenses, SBC and Dividends


| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|----------|---------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Interest Income | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest Income | | | | | | | 1.862 | 1.921 | 2.419 | 3.220 | 4.166 |
| Cash BoP | | | | | | | 43.210 | 57.333 | 74.424 | 94.161 | 116.377 |
| SOFR | | | | | | | 4,3% | 3,4% | 3,3% | 3,4% | 3,6% |
| Interest Expense | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest Expense | | | | | | | 489 | 489 | 489 | 489 | 489 |
| Debt BoP | | | | | | | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 | 8.463 |
| Cost of Debt (%) | | | | | | | 5,8% | 5,8% | 5,8% | 5,8% | 5,8% |
| Stock-based Compensation | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stock-based Compensation | 844 | 1.397 | 2.004 | 2.710 | 3.549 | 4.737 | 15.846 | 19.056 | 21.610 | 24.168 | 27.737 |
| % of Revenue | 8% | 8% | 7% | 10% | 6% | 4% | 7,2% | | | | |
| Dividends | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dividends | | | | | | | 80.033 | 96.845 | 111.845 | 125.890 | 143.620 |
| Cash Flow Before Dividends | | | | | | | 94.156 | 113.936 | 131.583 | 148.106 | 168.965 |
| Payout (%) | | | | | | | 85,0% | | | | |
| % of Net Income | | | | | | | 68% | 69% | 70% | 70% | 70% |
| Share Buybacks as % of Net Income | 14% | 9% | 4% | 239% | 33% | 47% | | | | | |
| Share Buybacks + Dividends | (390) | (395) | (399) | (10.437) | (9.928) | (34.540) | | | | | |
| Net Income | 2.796 | 4.332 | 9.752 | 4.368 | 29.760 | 72.880 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | Ţ | | | | |
| | | | | | | | . | | | | |


Given its already strong cash position, we chose to distribute dividends as a way to replace shareholder returns that would otherwise come from share buybacks



R&D ExpensesR&D dilution: scale is rising faster than innovation investment

R&D Expenses (USD millions)





ROIC

| Unit: US\$ Milion | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|-----------------------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Amortization years | 5 | | | | | |
| R&D of the period | | | | | | |
| 20 | 19 2.829 | 3.924 | 5.268 | 7.339 | 8.675 | 12.914 |
| 20. | 20 | 566 | 566 | 566 | 566 | 566 |
| 20 | 21 | | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| 20 | 22 | | | 1.054 | 1.054 | 1.054 |
| 20 | | | | | 1.468 | 1.468 |
| 20. | | | | | | 1.735 |
| R&D acumulation | 2.829 | 6.187 | 10.105 | 15.039 | 19.842 | 27.149 |
| | | | | | | |
| Adjusted Nopat | 5.343 | 7.752 | 13.693 | 9.568 | 33.242 | 76.986 |
| | | | | | | |
| Address of EDIT | 5.675 | 7.890 | 13.958 | 9.159 | 37.775 | 88.760 |
| Adjusted EBIT EBIT | 2.846 | 4.532 | 10.041 | 4.224 | 32.972 | 81.453 |
| R&D | 2.829 | 3.924 | 5.268 | 7.339 | 8.675 | 12.914 |
| R&D Amortization | 2.025 | 566 | 1.351 | 2.404 | 3.872 | 5.607 |
| Effective Tax Rate | -6% | -2% | -2% | 4% | -12% | -13% |
| Lifective rax nate | 070 | 270 | 270 | 470 | 1270 | 1070 |
| | 0.707 | 47.544 | | | | |
| Adjusted Invested capital | 6.797 | 17.541 | 23.686 | 30.396 | 39.624 | 60.089 |
| Adjusted ROIC | 79% | 44% | 58% | 31% | 84% | 128% |
| Adjusted ROIC (Ex-Goodwill) | 86% | 58% | 71% | 37% | 94% | 140% |
| NODATIV | | | | | | 0.50 |
| NOPAT Margin | | | | | | 0,59 |
| IC Turnover | | | | | | 2,17 |



Phase 2 | Presentation

Nvidia in a Circuit

Leadership and Technology in Semiconductor Design




Nvidia is a global technology company known for creating powerful graphics processors and tools that help computers run faster and smarter. Founded in 1993, it started by making graphics cards for gaming but has since expanded into areas like artificial intelligence, self-driving cars, and cloud computing. Nvidia doesn't manufacture its own chips; instead, it designs them and relies on specialized factories, like TSMC, to produce the hardware.

Shareholder Structure



Revenue by end-market (US\$ billion)

Historically, Nvidia's revenue was dominated by the gaming segment, but with the rise of artificial intelligence, the Data Center has gained prominence



Nvidia main products

NVIDIA's high-end GPUs reflect a bold bet on AI dominance, extreme performance, and premium pricing, shaping an increasingly segmented computing market

Nvidia B200: US\$30,000 - US\$40,000



The NVIDIA B200 is a next-gen Blackwell GPU designed for generative Al, offering up to 1.4 PFLOPs, FP4 support, 1.8 TB/s NVLink bandwidth, and high energy efficiency for large-scale Al and HPC

Nvidia H200: ~ US\$30,000



The NVIDIA H200 is a Hopper-based GPU with 141 GB of HBM3e and 4.8 TB/s bandwidth, designed for generative AI and HPC, offering high performance and energy efficiency


GeForce RTX 5090: US\$1,999



The GeForce RTX 5090 is NVIDIA's top consumer GPU, featuring Blackwell architecture, 21,760 CUDA cores, and 32 GB of GDDR7. It excels in gaming and AI with DLSS 4, ray tracing, and 8K support


Geographic Revenue in 2024 (%)

With a strong presence in the U.S., NVIDIA also operates in Singapore and Taiwan but has been losing ground in China due to trade restrictions



Estimated shipments of Nvidia Hopper GPUs in 2024, by customer

In 2024, Microsoft purchased twice as many Nvidia Hopper GPUs as ByteDance and Tencent, leading Al investments and becoming Nvidia's top customer






Unlocking a Technological Revolution

GPUs gained traction due to their scalable architecture, massive parallelism, and flexibility across applications



Why were GPUs so disruptive?


GPUs, with their massively higher core counts, enabled the parallel execution of simpler, repetitive operations—such as additions—across large datasets, offloading compute-bound workloads and allowing CPUs to focus on complex, interdependent tasks




| Product | Processing | Cores | Tasks | Strength |
|---------|------------|---------|----------------|------------------|
| CPUs | Sequential | ~96 | Interdependent | Operating System |
| GPUs | Parallel | ~21,760 | Separate | Vectorized |

Training Compute of Notable Machine Learning Systems Over Time (FLOP)


After the discovery of AlexNet, GPUs sparked the deep learning revolution



CPU performance advanced for decades under Moore's Law, driven by rising transistor counts and clock speeds. Over time, however, gains plateaued due to physical constraints—such as heat dissipation, quantum effects at nanoscales, and energy inefficiency. These limitations made traditional CPU scaling unsustainable, accelerating the shift toward alternative architectures like GPUs



Why Are GPUs remaining at the core of Technological Breakthroughs?



Various Applications:



Data Center

Purpose-built to handle massive AI and scientific workloads, enabling high-throughput, low-latency compute at scale.



Professional Visualization

Real-time rendering and physics-accurate simulation, tailored for complex content creation. Formally entered this space with GPUs in the early 2000s, expanding rapidly from 2018 with Omniverse and RTX



Gaming

Engineered for high frame rates, and rich visual effects, ideal for interactive entertainment. Gaming has been its core since the late 1990s, evolving from basic graphics to Al-enhanced experiences




Nvidia | Ecosystem | Management | Capture Al Market | Valuation | Scenarios

Three Steps Ahead: Unbothered by Competition

Consistently delivering superior results, reflecting deep expertise and the strength of the ecosystem built around GPUs

What about the competitors in this market?

Though rivals, NVIDIA focused early on building a GPU-centric ecosystem, while AMD spread across broader areas like CPUs




Despite AMD's efforts to enter the AI GPU market, there remains a significant performance gap in its flagship products — a gap NVIDIA has filled through its **ability to anticipate industry shifts**

| Product | π | BW ₂ | HBM Cap ₃ | Strength |
|---------------|------------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| B200 (NVIDIA) | 4.5 PFLOPS | 8TB/s | 192GB | Al Dominant |
| MI325X (AMD) | 2.6 PFLOPS | 6TB/s | 256 GB | Abundant Memory |


GPT-3 Training Results (GPU Hours Required x Number of GPUs Used)

Training LLM's becomes dramatically more efficient as each hardware generation unlocks more performance



Chip level cost-performance ratio (Performance/Cost)

NVIDIA's B200 redefines cost-performance efficiency, nearly tripling competitors' metrics and highlighting how far rivals lag behind in delivering value at scale



Guilherme Amaral, Kinea TMT Analyst

"NVIDIA has delivered higher performance by **capturing value-added layers** around the GPU business—not by full vertical integration, but by selectively controlling strategic components like CUDA and NVLink"



Evolution of NVIDIA GPU Processing Power (PFLOPs)

Unprecedented pace of performance scaling, with performance metrics results growing exponentially



NVIDIA consistently breaks through performance barriers, avoiding plateaus thanks to its unmatched pace of innovation. Through deep architectural redesigns and ecosystem control, each GPU generation brings exponential gains. This trajectory highlights NVIDIA's unique ability to reinvent and scale computing performance.






Scaling was Broken: NVLink Fixed It

NVLink unlocked the full potential of NVIDIA's GPU ecosystem, enabling seamless scalability beyond conventional limits


NVIDIA established its GPUs as top performers and scaled rapidly through sheer volume. However, to sustain performance gains as GPU clusters grew larger, new technologies were essential. This need for high-speed, low-latency communication across multiple GPUs led to the development of NVLink:

Why Data Centers have so many GPUs?

Due to GPUs parallelism capabilities it has two ways of improving its performance:



Scale-up has been key to sustaining the growth of GPU performance



With the creation of NVLink, NVIDIA not only scaled the number of GPUs and boosted performance, but also unlocked new product architectures and deeper integration across its ecosystem—especially with CUDA, enabling seamless multi-GPU computing and more efficient software-hardware synergy

Expanding Possibilities for GPU Usage:



GB200 1 Grace GPU 2 Blackwell GPUs Connected by NVLink-C2C Unified Memory



GB200 NVL72
36x GB200 Superchips
72 GPUs + 36 CPUs
Connected by NVLink Switch System
Neural ultra-speed

Jensen Huang, Nvidia's Founder & CEO

"NVLink wasn't just a technical innovation — it was the turning point that transformed NVIDIA from a chipmaker into a **builder of supercomputers**. By connecting GPUs with unprecedented bandwidth, we created a new class of superchips capable of powering the factories of the future"



How is it performing?

25% Reduction in Training Time

3X More throughput

NVIDIA's proprietary NVLink and NVSwitch technologies, reinforced by Mellanox's networking IP, provide ultra-low latency and high-bandwidth GPU-to-GPU and node-to-node interconnect. These capabilities enable efficient scaling of large AI and HPC workloads across thousands of GPUs

Gabriel Oliveira, Verde Global Equities Analyst

"NVIDIA has **NVLink and NVSwitch technologies**, which enable them to interconnect GPUs and nodes, delivering **faster performance than competitors**. A single NVLink can handle more data traffic than the entire global internet. **They make magic**"





CUDA: The Backbone of Nvidia's MOAT

Proprietary software has made it possible to program GPUs for specialized tasks, driving sustained performance gains over time

What made NVIDIA GPUs so flexible across End Markets?


With the launch of CUDA Software in 2006, GPUs evolved into more programmable machines, enabling the use of graphics cards across a wide range of applications and leveraging their parallel processing capabilities


Programmable GPUs

Flexibility for Applications

Performance Enhancing

Over nearly **two decades**, NVIDIA's software has been continuously refined and widely adopted by developers, creating a **high switching cost** due to deep-rooted academic training. This has fostered a strong developer base, reinforced by a **network effect**—more users mean more shared knowledge and institutional adoption






Optimization of GPUs constantly (even old ones)

Performance Enhancing ~200x Data Processing ~100x Deep Learning ~200x Computer Vision ~100x Agentic Al ~100x Science ~100x Recommender Systems

CUDA Developers (Million)

Beyond its accelerated growth, CUDA benefits from an already well-trained developer base, positioning it strongly for the years ahead



CUDA (NVIDIA) vs. ROCm (AMD): Measuring Content Presence on YouTube

We developed a Python script to quantify the volume of available content related to each software. Our findings indicate that CUDA is significantly more entrenched than ROCm, the AMD software




Our results:

2.8 X More Results for CUDA




The widespread availability of free content plays a crucial role in training new programmers with minimal effort



CUDA Downloads (Million)

The high number of CUDA downloads, combined with its non-transferable file formats, indicates a significant switching cost



The Role of Switching Costs, Yale

" In software markets, switching costs are often particularly high due to incompatibility of data formats, user retraining, and the need to rewrite custom code. These costs can deter customers from switching even if alternative products are available and better. In markets with high switching costs, a monopolist can continue to charge high prices or maintain market dominance long after the competitive advantage that initially attracted customers has eroded "



Nvidia | Ecosystem | Management | Capture Al Market | Valuation | Scenarios




Stairway to Heaven: Winning Business Model? Check!

Building on deep technical moats, NVIDIA combines scale, lock-in, and execution to sustain market leadership


With CUDA as the backbone of its strategy, NVIDIA creates synergies across its entire product portfolio. This integration reinforces customer lock-in, resulting in market share stability and pricing power — a competitive edge continually reinforced by its unmatched architecture release cycle

Compiling Competitive Advantages: Unmatched Technology Leadership Massive Scale Capability + General-purpose Architecture Switching Costs + Network Effect = Strong Customer Captivity Competition Demystified, Bruce Greenwald "The most powerful competitive advantages arise when customer captivity is combined with economies of scale. In such cases, a firm not only drives down its unit costs with volume but also makes it very hard for customers to leave, reinforcing its dominance over time."


NVIDIA vs AMD Market Share of Data Center Accelerators(%)



NVIDIA GPU Pricing Power Across Architectures (US\$)




A self-reinforcing loop of winning outcomes:



Release cadence will make the difference larger and larger

By leveraging a unified architecture and reinforcing feedback loops across its ecosystem, NVIDIA has significantly accelerated its GPU launch cadence, widening its lead over competitors

Time between architecture ramps (Months):



As the inventor of the GPU, NVIDIA leverages unrivaled expertise, elite engineering talent, and visionary leadership under Jensen Huang. This deep-rooted strength enables faster architecture transitions and a tighter product cycle



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Envisioning the Future: Mission is the Boss

Vision backed by action: Jensen's decisions consistently anticipate where the market is heading, and get there first



Co-Founded Nvidia
Started Nvidia to focus on computing market

TSMC Partnership
Early move to fabless model, ensuring scalable and advanced chip production

1998

The first modern GPU GeForce 256 revolutionized graphics

1999

Created CUDA
Enabled GPUs for AI and scientific use

Mellanox Acquisition
Strengthened Nvidia's position in high-performance networking

2019

Launched Blackwell
Powered Nvidia's next-gen Al
dominance globally


2024

The Nvidia Way, Tae Kim

Jensen Huang, Nvidia's Founder & CEO

1993

"The technology industry doesn't reward the past, it only rewards the future. No matter how successful you were yesterday, if you don't innovate today, you become irrelevant. That's why at Nvidia, we wake up every morning as if we were running out of time"



Jensen's Visionary Decision Mentality:


Core Beliefs Early Indicators of Future Success

Early Adopter of Disruptive End Markets "Since Nvidia's founding, Jensen has insisted that all Nvidia employees work at the "Speed of Light". He wants their work to be constrained only by the laws of physics – not by internal politics or financial concerns [...] "Speed of the light gets you into the market faster and makes it really, really hard, if not impossible, for your competitors to do better", a former Nvidia executive said. "How fast can you do it, and why aren't you doing it that faster."

NVIDIA WAY


ROIC₁ x WACC (%)

Jensen's investment choices have proven highly efficient: Nvidia's ROIC comfortably exceeds its WACC, showing a return on capital well above the opportunity cost



Price Action (US\$) x Jensen Ownership (%)

Even after the stock has appreciated by more than 300,000% since its IPO, Jensen has maintained a substantial amount of his equity stake, and remains confident in Nvidia's long-term potential




Where Execution Meets Consistency: Human capital advantage

How exceptional talent and a purpose-driven culture fuel technological leadership and innovation


CEO & Other NEO target pay mix 2024

Pay mix reflects a strong alignment between leadership incentives and the company's long-term, sustainable value creation goals




NVIDIA Employee Pay vs Semiconductor Industry Average (US\$ Thousand)

But Nvidia is not built solely on strong executives. The company also relies on a highly specialized technical workforce, attracted by an above-average compensation policy



Average executive tenure (Years)


With an average executive tenure of 16 years, more than double the industry average, NVIDIA stands out for its leadership stability, enabling deeper expertise and long-term vision



With an average executive tenure of 16 years, NVIDIA holds a clear competitive edge. Long-standing leadership allows the company to move with greater strategic consistency, make better-informed decisions, and execute long-term plans more effectively than competitors like AMD and Intel, whose leadership turnover limits continuity and deep industry insight

EBITDA/Employee (US\$ millions)

NVIDIA's EBITDA per employee highlights a highly skilled and productive workforce, generating value at a scale far beyond industry peers






Al is the future and Nvidia is Best Positioned to Capture it

From talent to execution, NVIDIA's integrated model turns technical leadership into real-world market dominance






By building a robust and integrated ecosystem, guided by a well-defined long-term vision from its highly specialized talent and by positioning itself early in the AI market, Nvidia has established a strong competitive moat and, in practice, a monopoly in AI-focused GPUs, making it extremely difficult for new players to enter this segment

NVIDIA Data Center Revenue x Big 4 Tech Companies Capex


Big Techs are ramping up Capex to chase Al infrastructure, and NVIDIA is capturing the lion's share of this spending

100%




Demand for advanced-Al capacity (% of total data center capacity demand)

Al demand is accelerating and exposing the gap between those merely following the trend and those ready to lead it, like NVIDIA



Value Added to market cap by segment (US\$ million)

Roughly 97% of NVIDIA's market value stems from Data Center, a clear bet on its AI exposure and outsized profit potential



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It's Still Early Days for Al

All is rewriting the rules of value creation: driving productivity gains and unlocking new innovation and business models

Why is AI changing everything:


- Al can learn and execute complex tasks across multiple domains something that used to require dozens of separate tools and systems
- A simple and universal interface drastically lowers the barrier to AI adoption making it accessible to any employee, developer, or company
- Al benefits from massive economies of scale and continuous improvement the more it's used, the better and more efficient it becomes

Why companies are going all in:

- Massive productivity gains: Al cuts the cost of operational tasks across customer service, marketing, engineering, and legal
- Al powers entirely new products from copilots to intelligent search and diagnostics creating high-margin revenue opportunities beyond cost reduction
- Fear of falling behind (the AI arms race): Big tech and industry leaders know that whoever masters AI will dominate the next decade


Al Model training Dataset Size by Model Release Year

The rapid rise of Generative AI has been fueled by an exponential increase in training data — with dataset sizes growing over 250% per year, enabling breakthroughs like GPT-3 and GPT-4




Years to Reach 100 MM Users

Al adoption shattered records, reaching 100 million users faster than any technology in history — a clear sign of the scale and speed of this new technological revolution



The Future of Al

We are still in the early stages of AI, and although there is still plenty of room to grow, Generative AI is already transforming the entire market



Andy Jassy, Amazon's CEO

"Generative AI is going to reinvent virtually every customer experience we know and enable altogether new ones about which we've only fantasized. ... Increasingly, you'll see AI change the norms in coding, search, shopping, personal assistants, primary care, cancer and drug research, biology, robotics, space, financial services, neighborhood networks, everything"



127

Capturing Al's Data Center Boom

How we see greater growth potential for NVIDIA and Why our view diverges from market consensus

Assumptions for NVIDIA's Data Center Revenue Forecast

We project faster growth in the data center GPU market than consensus expects, and believe NVIDIA is well positioned to maintain its leadership and capture the bulk of this upside


| US\$ Million | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E | 2028E | 2029E |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Global Data Center Capex | 556.600 | 673.486 | 814.918 | 986.051 | 1.193.122 |
| Global Data Center Capex (%YOY) | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% | 21% |
| % of Data Center CAPEX for GPUs | 45% | 45% | 45% | 45% | 45% |
| NVIDIA's Data Center Revenue | 220.414 | 260.639 | 311.706 | 377.164 | 456.369 |
| % Of Global CAPEX | 40% | 39% | 38% | 38% | 38% |
| % of NVIDIA GPU Market Share | 88% | 86% | 85% | 85% | 85% |

Where We Diverge From the Market?

While the market is pricing in a deceleration in data center investments starting in 2028 due to concerns about overcapacity, we hold a different view. We believe the AI market is still in its early stages and will continue to expand significantly, driving sustained demand for high-performance infrastructure. The high volume of AI mentions in the latest MAG 7 earnings calls supports this thesis — indicating that major tech companies remain heavily focused on AI as a core growth driver and are likely to keep investing aggressively in data center capacity


Mentions of AI in Latest Earnings Calls






Data Center NVIDIA's Revenue x Consensus

We expect stronger data center growth than consensus, driven by AI, with the divergence becoming more pronounced from 2028 onward



Future Revenue Opportunities

Geopolitical tailwinds and robotics adoption could unlock incremental revenues — both currently excluded from our model but making a potential source of upside asymmetry




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Is our Desired IRR Viable? Yes!

Our base case, grounded in conservative multiples, supports a feasible IRR

Entry & Exit: Taking a Conservative Stance — Exiting at the 5-Year Lowest



Our Two-stage Fair-Multiple Model Signals a Favorable Entry Point:


| | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Fair Multiple | 29.8 | 25.3 | 22.0 | 19.6 |
| | | | | |
| ROE | 121% | 121% | 121% | 121% |
| Growth | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| Discount Rate | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% |
| Perpetuity Multiple | 26.3 | 22.8 | 20.4 | 18.8 |
| | | | | |
| Growth Stage | 3.4 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
| | | | | |

| | quired P/E Analy CAGR: 421% | sis | | | Earnings CA | GR | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------------|-------|-----|-----|
| -, | | 10% | 15% | 20% | 25% | 30% | 35% | 40% |
| | Min: 15% | 41x | 32x | 26x | 21x | 17x | 14x | 11x |
| IRR | Base: 20% | 47x | 37x | 29x | 24x | (19x) | 16x | 13x |
| | Bull: 25% | 53x | 42x | 34x | 27x | 22x | 18x | 15x |

| 1 | Required P/E Analysis 5y CAGR: 139% Revenue CAGR | | | | | | | |
|-----|--|-----|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | | 15% | 20% | 25% | 30% | 35% | 40% | 45% |
| | Min: 15% | 35x | 28x | 23x | 18x | 15x | 12x | 10x |
| IRR | Base: 20% | 40x | 32x | 26x | 20 x | 17x | 14x | 12x |
| | Bull: 25% | 45x | 36x | 29x | 24x | 20x | 16x | 13x |

PEG Ratio (12mFw):

NVIDIA's exceptional earnings growth justifies its P/E multiple



NVIDIA has consistently delivered EPS above consensus expectations over time, strengthening our conviction in its ability to consistently deliver:

93% of Quarter Results have surprised EPS Market Consensus



Thesis Scenarios & How much could we Lose?

Sensitivity Analysis of Our Base Case, and Downside Scenarios That Could Break the Thesis

What Drives Our NVIDIA IRR: A Decomposition of Return Drivers and Headwinds

IRR is largely a function of strong Net Income Growth — but held back by our cautious multiple



IRR Scenarios Analysis

While the upside potential remains compelling, disciplined monitoring of AI-driven capex is needed

| | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|
| Growth Global Data Center CapEx | 18.0% | 21.0% | 25.0% |
| % of Data Center CapEx for GPUs | 40.0% | 45.0% | 50.0% |
| % of NVIDIA GPU Market Share | 75.0% | 88.0% | 90.0% |
| Gross Margin | 65.0% | 75.0% | 80.0% |
| Exit Multiple | 15x | 20x | 25x |
| IRR | (9.1%) | 18.9% | 43.0% |

Where Our Thesis Could Break: Demand for AI Falls Short or Competitive Pressures Undermine Nvidia's GPU Leadership

IRR Impact Under Combined Downside Scenarios: Slower Al Infrastructure Investment and Structural Loss of Nvidia's GPU Market Share

ASICs Chips

These are custom chips built for specific tasks, and in some cases, they can outperform GPUs in efficiency and cost for AI workloads. If hyperscalers like Google and Amazon successfully scale their own ASICs, Nvidia risks losing substantial GPU market share and the pricing power that underpins its high margins. This could lead to a structural decline in profitability and a weakening of the competitive moat that currently supports its dominant position in Al infrastructure with potential impact starting from 2028 onward.

| | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | |
|----------------------|------------|------------|------------|--|
| NVIDIA Market Share: | 50% | 60% | 70% | |
| Gross Margin: | 60% | 65% | 70% | |
| IRR | -7% IRR | 1% IRR | 9% | |

Slow Down in Al Investments

If enterprises and hyperscalers begin to question the near-term returns from AI projects, a pullback in spending could occur — especially after the recent wave of aggressive investment. This would not only lead to a slower expansion of total data center infrastructure, but also reduce the percentage of CapEx allocated to GPUs. Since Nvidia's growth is highly tied to the adoption of AI at scale, any hesitation or delay in AI monetization could directly pressure its revenue trajectory, lower utilization rates, and weaken its pricing leverage in the data center stack.

| | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | |
|------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|--|
| CAGR Capex DC: | 15% | 17% | 19% | |
| % of Accelerators Share: 30% | | 35% | 40% | |
| IRR | -4% IRR | 4% IRR | 11% | |






Calls


Call Guilherme Amaral - Kinea

Our conversation with Guilherme Amaral from Kinea helped us frame potential value triggers for NVIDIA over the coming months, adding depth to our timing and catalyst assessment






Call Jon Y – Asianometry





Call José Moreira – PRAGMA


Our conversation with José from PRAGMA helped us better understand the interdependencies across the semiconductor value chain






Call Gabriel Oliveira – Verde Asset

Our conversation with Gabriel Oliveira from Verde Asset provided valuable insights on NVIDIA's positioning and competitive dynamics, helping us strengthen our conviction on the company's long-term moat





Call João Pedro Freitas - Mainú Capital





Call Ilan Crohmal - Occam

Our conversation with Ilan Crohmal from Occam helped us deepen our understanding of NVIDIA's strategic roadmap and its ability to sustain leadership in the AI compute space






Call Karina Fugita — Geo Capital
Our conversation with Karina Fugita from GeoCapital reinforced the critical role of the semiconductor supply chain in enabling AI advancements, highlighting how structural investments in leading-edge infrastructure remain a key bottleneck and competitive moat





Call Caio Bessa – M Square
Our conversation with Caio Bessa helped us critically assess the key risks around our NVIDIA thesis and provided valuable perspective on how investors are currently positioning around the stock






Call Lucas Dias — Aster Capital
Our conversation with Lucas from Aster Capital highlighted that AI demand remains a structural trend, with hyperscalers continuing to invest aggressively to support AI workloads and expanding use cases





Call Igor Fernandes – AZ Quest

Our conversation with Igor Fernandes from AZ Quest helped us refine our view on the company's management quality, highlighting the importance of strong execution capabilities and strategic vision in capturing the AI-driven growth opportunity





Call Adriano Marques – Ascenty
Our conversation with Adriano Marques, from Ascenty (the largest data center operator in Latin America), reinforced the strong and sustained demand for data center capacity, particularly driven by AI workloads and hyperscaler clients

